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ABSTRACT 
In a previous study, multiple regression techniques were applied to Flight Operations 
Quality Assurance-derived data to develop parsimonious model(s) for fuel 
consumption on the Boeing 757 airplane.  The present study examined several data 
mining algorithms, including neural networks, on the fuel consumption problem and 
compared them to the multiple regression results obtained earlier. Using regression 
methods, parsimonious models were obtained that explained approximately 85% of 
the variation in fuel flow.  In general data mining methods were more effective in 
predicting fuel consumption.  Classification and Regression Tree methods reported 
correlation coefficients of .91 to .92, and General Linear Models and Multilayer 
Perceptron neural networks reported correlation coefficients of about .99.  These data 
mining models show great promise for use in further examining large FOQA 
databases for operational and safety improvements. 
 
Alan Stolzer holds a Ph.D. in Technology Management—Quality Systems from Indiana State 
University. He holds FAA Airline Transport Pilot, Certified Flight Instructor, and Aircraft 
Mechanic certificates.  He holds Quality Engineering, Manager, and Auditor certifications from 
ASQ, and a Project Manager certification from PMI.  He is the Director of the Quality 
Engineering Systems in Transportation (QUEST) Research Center.  
 
Carl Halford is the Research Manager at SLU’s Center for Quality Engineering Systems in 
Transportation.  Mr. Halford holds an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, with an assortment of 
type ratings, and has over 9000 hours of flight time in a variety of aircraft.  Halford is a certified 
Manager of Quality/Organizational Excellence and Quality Auditor, and has been a Certified 
ISO 9001:2000 Lead Auditor.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One might wonder what mining the genome, re-engineering the 
immigration system, and ensuring our homeland security have in common.  
The answer is data mining (DM).   
Unlocking the secrets of the human gene is expected to yield great 
benefits for scientists and pharmaceutical companies battling diseases.  But 
cataloging the estimated 100,000 human genes is no small task.  Consider 
the fact that every human cell has 23 pairs of chromosomes containing about 
3.5 billion pairs of nucleotides.  The genes that carry code to make protein 
amount to less than 3% of all genes; the remaining 97% is genetic noise.  
These protein-producing genes are those that result in cancer and genetic 
problems when they go awry, and it is these genes that need to be understood 
by scientists.  Unfortunately, the signals in the genes have a language all 
their own, and they are hidden and noisy.  Among the tools used to analyze 
these signals is a form of DM called artificial neural networks.  Neural 
networks help scientists locate the genes of interest through pattern 
recognition and understand their function—knowledge which may lead to 
breakthroughs in combating these health crises (Regalado, 1999). 
DM is also playing a role in our efforts to control the immigration 
problem and ensure our homeland security.   All 19 hijackers involved in the 
attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, entered the country legally.  
There was no information available to the authorities that would have 
suggested that allowing them to enter the country was inconsistent with our 
national security interests.  Strickland and Willard (2002) assert that 
effective, preventive homeland security requires a fundamental re-
engineering of the immigration system based on the concept of having better 
information achieved through effective DM methods and processes to assure 
quality information.  These authors propose a vastly improved system of 
‘knowledge development tools’ to mine new data sources and identify visa 
applicants that warrant attention. 
DM has been gaining popularity in numerous other industries in recent 
years, including the transportation industry.  Studies of DM methods to 
improve traffic safety programs (Solomon, Nguyen, Liebowitz, & Agresti, 
2006), applying DM techniques to forecast the number of airline passengers 
in Saudi Arabia (BaFail, 2004), and many others, are evidenced in the 
literature.  Many of these studies seek to make greater use of existing 
databases to learn more about the problem or issue at hand than more 
traditional methods have afforded, or to discover what results DM methods 
might yield on previously performed studies.  The present study seeks to do 
the latter using Stolzer’s (2003) work to create a statistical model for 
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predicting fuel consumption on the Boeing 757 aircraft fleet within an air 
carrier’s operating environment. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study uses the comprehensive suite of DM tools contained in 
StatSoft’s STATISTICA (2003) software to create models for predicting fuel 
consumption, and compares the results to those of a previous study.   The 
earlier study developed parsimonious models for fuel consumption using 
multiple regression analysis to analyze Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
(FOQA)-derived data, with the objective of being able to identify outliers 
(specific flights) with respect to fuel consumption.  Specifically, the goal of 
the present study was to ascertain whether DM methods produce fuel 
consumption models with superior predictive capability than traditional 
statistical methods such as multiple regression techniques.  To accomplish 
this goal, we evaluated and benchmarked the results of the different DM 
methods offered within STATISTICA; and determined the optimum DM 
method. 
BACKGROUND 
What is data mining? 
Data mining is an analytic process designed to explore large amounts of 
data in search of consistent patterns and/or systematic relationships between 
variables (StatSoft, 2003).  It is used for such broad areas as accurately 
evaluating insurance risk, predicting customer demand for goods and 
services, predicting the prices of stocks and commodities, monitoring 
expensive and critical equipment, conducting yield analysis and quality 
control, and predicting credit risk. 
Traditional statistical techniques are not as useful on very large 
databases because all mean comparisons are significant and standard 
measures of variability are extremely small.  Due in part to this limitation, 
DM techniques increased in popularity in the mid to late 1990s.  DM tools 
are based on standard statistical techniques and artificial intelligence analysis 
techniques, and are applied to large databases for the purpose of teasing out 
otherwise undiscovered data attributes, trends and patterns.  There are 
numerous methods of DM; the following is only the most cursory overview 
of several of the more popular methods. 
1. Regression modeling normally begins with a hypothesis which is 
tested by this common statistical technique.  Linear regression 
(commonly used for prediction) and logistic regression (used for 
estimating probabilities of events) are two examples of regression 
modeling.     
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2. Visualization is an important concept in DM.  Through the study of 
multidimensional graphs the analysis is able to detect trends, 
patterns, or relationships. 
3. Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis tool that consists of 
several different algorithms and methods for grouping objects of 
similar kind into respective categories.  The goal of cluster analysis 
is to sort different objects into groups in a way that the degree of 
association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the 
same group and minimal if they do not.  Cluster analysis can be 
used to discover structures in data without explaining why they 
exist. 
4. Decision trees are very popular classification models.  They are 
called decision trees because the resulting model is presented in the 
form of a tree structure.  The visual presentation makes the decision 
tree model very easy to understand.  Decision tree methods include 
Classification and Regression Trees (C&RT) and Chi-squared 
Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID).   
5. Neural networks are analytic techniques that are intended to 
simulate cognitive functions.  These techniques learn with each 
iteration through the data, and are capable of predicting new 
observations (on specific variables) from other observations (on the 
same or other variables).    
 
Steps in DM 
There are three basic stages to most DM projects, as depicted in Figure 
1: initial exploration; model building and validation; and deployment.  Initial 
exploration refers to the preparation of the data, which may include cleaning 
of the data, data transformations, selecting subsets of records, and 
performing feature selection operations.  Model building and validation 
involves evaluating various models for predictive performance and choosing 
the most appropriate one for the project.  Deployment refers to the 
application of the chosen model or models to generate predictions or 
estimates of the outcome.   
Figure 1.  Steps in Data Mining 
 
 
 
Crucial concepts in DM 
Of course, not all projects are the same and few involve the full range of 
DM tools and methods, but some familiarity with the crucial concepts in DM 
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is important.  These concepts are summarized below (StatSoft, 2003; Wang, 
2003). 
1. Data preparation, cleaning, and transformation.  Many times this is 
the most time-consuming aspect of the project, and one that is often 
given little attention.  Data that is collected via an automatic 
process, which probably includes most input data in DM projects, 
frequently contains data that contain out of range values, impossible 
data combinations, and other irregularities.  Various methods are 
employed to clean the data to make it usable, or to eliminate the 
data from the analysis. 
2. Feature selection.  A feature selection technique enables the analyst 
to include the best variables for the project when the data set 
includes more variables than can be reasonably used. 
3. Feature extraction.  Feature extraction techniques attempt to 
aggregate the predictors in some way in order to extract the 
common information contained in them that is most useful for 
model building.  Typical methods include Factor Analysis and 
Principal Components Analysis, Multidimensional Scaling, Partial 
Least Squares methods, and others. 
4. Predictive DM.  This type of DM project is intended to develop 
statistical or neural network models that can be used to predict 
objects of interest.   
5. Sampling, training, and testing (hold-out) samples.  In most DM 
projects, only a randomly chosen subset of the data is used.  This 
enables the analyst to evaluate multiple methods using different 
samples, and then test these methods to gain insight into the 
predictive capability of the results. 
6. Over-sampling particular strata to over-represent rare events 
(stratified sampling).  Sometimes it is necessary to employ stratified 
sampling to systematically over-sample rare events of interest.  This 
precludes predictions of a no response for all cases if simple 
random sampling were used when, in fact, these (rare) events are 
present.   
7. Machine learning.  Machine learning refers to the application of 
generic model-fitting or classification algorithms for predictive 
DM, and reminds us that the emphasis in DM is accuracy of 
prediction rather than having a clear and interpretable 
understanding of the prediction.   
8. Deployment.  Deployment is the application of a trained model so 
that predictions can be obtained for new data. 
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STATISTICA 
STATISTICA, a suite of analytic software products produced by StatSoft 
(2003), was used for this study.   STATISTICA provides a comprehensive 
array of data analysis, data management, data visualization, and DM 
procedures.  Its techniques include a wide selection of predictive modeling, 
clustering, classification, and exploratory techniques in a single software 
platform.   STATISTICA includes an extensive array of analytic, graphical, 
and data management functions, as well as DM and machine learning 
algorithms, including: support vector machines, EM (Expectation 
Maximization) and k-Means clustering, CART, generalized additive models, 
independent component analysis, stochastic gradient boosted trees, 
ensembles of neural networks, automatic feature selection, MARSplines 
(Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines), CHAID trees, nearest neighbor 
methods, association rules, random forests, and others (StatSoft, 2003). 
 
Articles/studies on DM for airline safety 
Today DM techniques are used for many different purposes in many 
industries, including the aviation industry.  For example, an exploratory 
study on FOQA database at a major air carrier took place in 2005 (Global 
Aviation Information Network, 2005).  The cooperative study involved the 
air carrier, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Global Aviation 
Information Network, and a DM software provider, and was intended to 
provide guidance on tools that may be useful in enhancing the current 
analysis of airline digital flight data.  This study focused on principal 
components analysis, correlation of different events, conditional (Trellis) 
graphics, tree-based models, and neural networks.  In part, the DM study 
found that certain methods showed promise in improving efficiency by 
automating some of the query and output process.  Principal components 
analysis and clustering methods were deemed helpful for data reduction and 
characterization of correlation structures.  Tree-based models provided a 
modeling structure for understanding the relationship between flight events 
and flight parameters, and for assessing the importance of variables.  Neural 
network models were deemed less useful due to their inability to distinguish 
between landing approaches that resulted in a successful landing from those 
that resulted in a go around.  The study also noted an additional disadvantage 
that neural networks are more difficult to interpret than tree-based models. 
Another similar study funded by the FAA involved the analysis of 
FOQA data on the airline’s Boeing 777 and 747 fleets.  The objective of this 
study was to determine whether DM techniques can help improve airline or 
system safety by identifying risks, and assess the effectiveness of operational 
changes.  Three learning algorithms, that is, decision trees, clustering and 
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association rules, were applied to the data.  In general, the DM tools 
identified many interesting patterns and associations beneath the surface that 
had not been identified by the air carrier’s flight data monitoring program 
(Global Aviation Information Network, 2004). 
Helicopter health and usage management systems also generate large 
amounts of data that are used mainly for diagnostic purposes to detect 
helicopter faults.  An initiative by the Ministry of Defense in the United 
Kingdom has been to apply tools that improved analysis capability, increase 
levels of automation, and provide enhanced use of resources.  The study 
evaluated several supervised and unsupervised methods, and also explored 
fusing the results of unsupervised techniques with the judgments of other 
mathematical and artificial intelligence tools, such as logic, fuzzy logic, and 
Bayesian networks (Knight, Cook, & Azzam, 2005). 
PREVIOUS STUDY 
Our previous study was designed to develop a parsimonious model(s) 
for fuel consumption using multiple regression analysis to analyze FOQA-
derived data, with the objective of being able to identify outliers (specific 
flights) with respect to fuel consumption (Stolzer, 2003).  The data used for 
the study were provided by a major air carrier, and consisted of 1,863 routine 
passenger-carrying flights on Boeing 757 aircraft.   
Depending on the aircraft involved, data is captured on a few dozen to 
thousands of parameters (e.g., altitude, airspeed, throttle position, aileron 
deflection) each second; more than 180 parameters were contained in the 
subject dataset.  Since the object of interest was limited to predicting fuel 
flow, the vast majority of these parameters were eliminated based on 
relevance.  Following a reasoned elimination of other variables due to 
multicollinearity, curvilinearity, skewness and other adverse conditions, the 
remaining variables (i.e., 10) were entered into a standard, non-stepwise 
regression with fuel flow (ff) as the dependent variable.  Since there is fuel 
flow on two engines on a Boeing 757 aircraft and parameters are recorded 
for each, two equations were produced; one for engine 1 (ENG1ff) and one 
for engine 2 (ENG2ff).   
Fuel flow was best predicted by calibrated airspeed (CAS), gross weight 
(GWeight), and engine N2 (ENGxn2; i.e., high compressor speed, see Table 
1 for a definition of each of the FOQA parameters used in the study).  The 
resulting equations were as follows: 
ENG1ff: – 9170.077 + 10.943 CAS + 0.008657 GWeight + 93.701 
ENG1n2, with an R2 (coefficient of determination) of .853   
ENG2ff: – 9347.178 + 10.835 CAS + 0.008726 GWeight + 95.616 
ENG2n2, with an R2 of .872   
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The models formulated were checked for adequacy through the 
examination of residuals, and testing for a linear fit of the predictors to the 
dependent variable.  Based on an analysis of residuals and tests for linear fit, 
there did not appear to be any correlation between random errors, the 
variables appeared to be linearly related, and there appeared to be reasonably 
consistent variances in the data for both models.   
To validate the models, data on 179 additional flights were obtained.  
These data were fitted using the derived models and the performance of both 
models suggested that they were likely to be successful as predictors.  In 
fact, the R2 on engines 1 and 2 with the new data were 86.3% and 87.2%, 
respectively, which was approximately equivalent to the fit of the original 
data. 
Table 1. Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) Parameters  
 
FOQA Parameter Name 
 
Definition 
Mach Mach 
CAS Calibrated airspeed 
TAT Total air temperature 
ALT Altitude 
GWeight Gross weight 
ENG1epr, ENG2epr Engine 1 and 2exhaust pressure ratio 
ENG1ff, ENG2ff Engine 1 and 2 fuel flow 
ENG1n1, ENG2n1 Engine 1 and 2 low compressor speed 
ENG1n2, ENG2n2 Engine 1 and 2 high compressor speed 
ENG1egt, ENG2egt Engine 1 and 2 exhaust gas temperature 
AOA Angle of attack 
ATTroll Angle of bank 
ATTpitch Pitch attitude 
SFCstab Stabilizer position 
CTLspdbrk Speedbrake control position 
SFCalrn Left aileron position 
SFCalrnrt Right aileron position 
SFCrudder Rudder position 
SFCelev Left elevator position 
SFCelevrt Right elevator position 
SFCflap Flap position 
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METHODOLOGY 
In the previous study, much effort was made to transform the data that 
was problematic or to perform a reasoned elimination of some of the 
variables.  In fact, a nontrivial number of variables had to be eliminated in 
order to avoid violations of assumptions and, thus, have confidence in the 
results.  Admittedly, this had the effect of reducing the performance of the 
regression models, but the trade-off between model performance and 
confidence in the result is a conundrum routinely faced by analysts.  By 
contrast, DM methods are generally robust to non-linear data, complex 
relationships, and non-normal distributions; thus, no pre-processing or 
transformations were performed as part of the DM project.   
It should be noted that the regression analyses performed in the previous 
study were ultimately performed using clean data that met all reasonable 
assumptions for regression studies, and so a high predictive capability of the 
models was anticipated even though only a small subset of predictors were 
used.  Given these conditions, it was not anticipated that DM methods would 
perform significantly better than multiple linear regression since the 
regression models’ explained variance was .853 (ENG1ff) and .872 
(ENG2ff). 
To facilitate the desired comparison, a standard recursive partitioning 
(i.e., tree) method called Classification and Regression Tree Models (C&RT) 
was performed due to its popularity and ease of interpretation.  The C&RT 
method builds classification and regression trees for predicting variables.   
STATISTICA contains numerous algorithms for predicting continuous or 
categorical variables from a set of continuous predictors and/or categorical 
factor effects.  Each child node in the tree diagram represents a bivariate split 
on one of the predictors.  Terminal nodes indicate actual predicted values for 
sets of cases.  The dendrograms created in this process are quite easy to 
review and interpret to understand the sets of if/then statements created by 
the model.   
This was followed by an Advanced Comprehensive Regression Models 
(ACRM) project.  This model has several pre-arranged nodes for fitting 
linear, nonlinear, regression-tree, CHAID and Exhaustive CHAID, and 
different neural network architectures to a continuous dependent variable, 
and for automatically generating deployment information. 
Finally,  STATISTICA’s Intelligent Problem Solver (IPS) procedure was 
used.  The IPS is a sophisticated tool for the creation and testing of neural 
networks for data analysis and prediction problems.  It designs a number of 
networks to solve the problem, copies these into the current network set, and 
then selects those networks into the results dialog, allowing testing to be 
performed in a variety of ways.  These latter two projects are STATISTICA 
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methods that allow a comparison of numerous DM algorithms 
simultaneously on a dataset.   
In addition to standard analysis techniques, goodness of fit tests were 
run to compare the performance of various methods. 
RESULTS 
Initial exploration 
The analyst is familiar with the dataset since it was used in the previous 
study; however, it was examined again for out of range values, impossible 
data combinations, and other irregularities.  It was determined that the 
dataset was more than adequate for the present study. 
 
Model building and validation (and deployment)   
C&RTs were performed.  The C&RT method was run using V-fold 
cross-validation (a technique where repeated (v) random samples are drawn 
from the data for the analysis).  The variables contained in the tree diagram 
for the Engine 1 model included CAS, GWeight, ENG1n1, ENG1egt, and 
ALT.  A goodness of fit test performed on this model yields the results as 
depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of Goodness of Fit—Engine 1 Fuel Flow 
Factor Predicted 
Mean Square Error 13449.18 
Mean Absolute Error        89.06 
Mean Relative Squared Error          0.00 
Mean Relative Absolute Error          0.03 
Correlation Coefficient          0.92 
 
The C&RT analysis was also performed on the ENG2ff model.  The tree 
diagram for ENG2ff included CAS, GWeight, ENG2n1, and ENG2n2.  A 
goodness of fit test performed on this model yields the results as depicted in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3. Summary of Goodness of Fit—Engine 2 Fuel Flow 
Factor Predicted 
Mean Square Error 13674.90 
Mean Absolute Error        89.25 
Mean Relative Squared Error         0.00 
Mean Relative Absolute Error         0.03 
Correlation Coefficient         0.91 
The next method used was STATISTICA’s ACRM project. This model 
fits several DM methods to a continuous dependent variable, and 
automatically generates deployment information.  Figure 3 depicts the 
STATISTICA workspace as it is configured to run this project.   
Figure 2.   STATISTICA Workspace for Advanced Comprehensive Regression Model 
Project 
 
Table 4 contains the summary output from goodness of fit tests on the 
various methods explored by the ACRM tool on ENG1ff. 
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Table 4. Summary of Goodness of Fit for Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Advanced Comprehensive 
Regression Model 
Factor GLM 
Predicted 
Trees 
Predicted
CHAID 
Predicted
ECHAID
Predicted
MLP 
Predicted
RBF 
Predicted 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
670.201 9025.980 56545.54 46538.480 553.511 55059.900 
Mean 
Absolute 
Error 
19.253 71.926 181.990 166.860 17.7905 181.690 
Mean 
Relative 
Squared 
Error 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean 
Relative 
Absolute 
Error 
0.006 0.021 0.050 0.050 0.005 0.050 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.996 0.941 0.530 0.640 0.997 0.550 
GLM – Generalized Linear Model 
CHAID - Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection Model 
ECHAID - Exhaustive Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detection Model 
MLP - Multilayer Perceptron Model 
RBF - Radial Basis Function Model 
Both the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) and the Multilayer 
Perceptron (MLP) had very high correlation coefficients exceeding 0.995 
and relatively low error measures.  Figure 4 depicts a plot of the predicted 
variable versus the observed, and Figure 5 depicts a plot of the residuals 
versus the observed variable for the GLM for ENG1ff. 
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Figure 3.  General Linear Model of Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Predicted versus Observed 
Predicted variable PMML_GLM3Pred for ENG1ff 
 vs. observed variable ENG1ff
2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 4000 4200 4400 4600
ENG1ff
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
3600
3800
4000
4200
4400
4600
P
M
M
L_
G
LM
3P
re
d 
fo
r E
N
G
1f
f
 
Figure 4.  General Linear Model of Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Residuals versus Observed 
Residuals ( PMML_GLM3Pred for ENG1ff - ENG1ff   ) 
 vs. observed ENG1ff
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Figure 5.  Multilayer Perceptron for Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Predicted versus Observed 
Predicted variable PMML_RMLP7Pred for ENG1ff 
 vs. observed variable ENG1ff
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Figure 6.  Multilayer Perceptron for Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Residuals versus Observed 
Residuals ( PMML_RMLP7Pred for ENG1ff - ENG1ff   ) 
 vs. observed ENG1ff
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Figure 6 depicts a plot of the predicted variable versus the observed 
variable, and Figure 7 depicts a plot of the residuals versus the observed for 
the MLP. 
Table 5 contains the summary output from goodness of fit tests on the 
various methods explored by the ACRM tool on the ENG2ff model.  As with 
the ENG1ff model it can be concluded that the GLM and the MLP models 
provided the best predictive capability for ENG2ff of the models tested. 
Table 5. Summary of Goodness of Fit for Engine 2 Fuel Flow: Advanced Comprehensive 
Regression Model 
Factor GLM Predicted 
Trees 
Predicted
CHAID 
Predicted
ECHAID
Predicted
MLP 
Predicted
RBF 
Predicted 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
633.783 8899.214 42906.560 38836.210 786.319 32815.580 
Mean 
Absolute 
Error 
18.734 68.991 159.980 150.560 19.877 129.160 
Mean 
Relative 
Squared 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean 
Relative 
Absolute 
Error 
0.006 0.020 0.050 0.040 0.006 0.040 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.996 0.945 0.690 0.720 0.995 0.770 
GLM – Generalized Linear Model 
CHAID - Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection Model 
ECHAID - Exhaustive Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detection Model 
MLP - Multilayer Perceptron Model 
RBF - Radial Basis Function Model 
The final procedure used was STATISTICA’s IPS.  The IPS creates and 
tests several neural networks for data analysis and prediction problems.  
Tables 6 and 7 are summaries of a goodness of fit analyses for the five 
models retained for ENG1ff and ENG2ff, respectively. 
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Table 6. Summary of Goodness of Fit for Engine 1 Fuel Flow: Intelligent Problem Solver 
 
Factor 
ENG1ff 
Model 1 
GLM 
ENG1ff 
Model 2 
MLP 
ENG1ff 
Model 3 
MLP 
ENG1ff 
Model 4 
RBF 
ENG1ff 
Model 5 
RBF 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
683.411 690.712 711.707 6043.053 4424.089 
Mean 
Absolute 
Error 
19.061 19.030 20.130 48.525 50.813 
Mean 
Relative 
Squared 
Error 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean 
Relative 
Absolute 
Error  
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.015 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.961 0.971 
ENG1ff – Engine 1 Fuel Flow 
GLM – General Linear Model 
MLP – Multilayer Perceptron Model 
RBF - Radial Basis Function Model 
Table 7. Summary of Goodness of Fit for Engine 2 Fuel Flow: Intelligent Problem Solver 
Factor 
ENG2ff 
Model 1 
Linear 
ENG2ff 
Model 2 
MLP 
ENG2ff 
Model 3 
MLP 
ENG2ff 
Model 4 
RBF 
ENG2ff 
Model 5 
RBF 
Mean 
Square Error 736.102 600.180 660.567 1802.759 1706.794 
Mean 
Absolute 
Error 
20.319 18.778 19.273 29.733 28.654 
Mean 
Relative 
Squared 
Error 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean 
Relative 
Absolute 
Error 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.988 0.989 
ENG2ff – Engine 2 Fuel Flow 
GLM – General Linear Model 
MLP – Multilayer Perceptron Model 
RBF - Radial Basis Function Model 
Figure 7 presents a composite graph of all five models evaluated 
depicting observed versus residuals for the ENG2ff model.   This graph 
shows a fairly tight pattern of observations with only few possible outliers, 
which are mostly found in Models 4 and 5 - the two Radial Basis Function 
(RBF) models. 
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Figure 7.  Composite Graph of all Five Models Evaluated Depicting Observed versus 
Residuals for the Engine 2 Fuel Flow Model 
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DISCUSSION 
An earlier study was performed using multiple regression methods to 
predict fuel consumption on an air carrier’s Boeing 757 fleet of aircraft.  It 
was determined that some of the data generated by the FOQA system 
violated assumptions of regression methods, and attempts to transform the 
data were minimally successful.  To ensure a high level of confidence in the 
results, those data were removed from further consideration.  The remaining 
data produced models with excellent predictive capability.  Specifically, the 
ENG1ff and ENG2ff models had correlation coefficients of .853 and .872 
respectively, and tested on new data at approximately these values.   
The goal of the present study was to evaluate various DM techniques on 
the same dataset used in the previous study.  A recursive partitioning 
method, C&RT, and STATISTICA’s ACRM and IPS algorithms were 
deployed on the data.  Since DM methods are generally robust to data 
condition problems, no additional analysis was performed on the data.   
The recursive partitioning method, C&RT, produced excellent results, 
that is, correlation coefficients of .92 and .91.  Further, the dendrograms 
produced by the C&RT are easy to interpret (these graphics are difficult to 
extract from the software in a readable format and, thus, are not included in 
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this manuscript).  For example, it can easily be determined that the first node 
generated in the ENG2ff dendrogram is based on variable CAS, the bivariate 
nodes from CAS are GWeight and CAS, the nodes from GWeight are 
ENG2n1 and GWeight, and so on.  This information enables the analyst to 
better understand the classifications being determined by the algorithm.     
The ACRMs also produced excellent results on the data.  The 
correlation coefficients reported by each of the models were very high.  The 
GLM reported correlation coefficients of .996 for both ENG1ff and ENG2ff, 
and the MLP reported correlation coefficients of .997 and .995 for ENG1ff 
and ENG2ff, respectively.  These values significantly exceed those obtained 
by standard multiple regression methods.  The error values for the GLM and 
the MLP models were also low relative to the other models examined.    
The IPS model produced five models with no correlation coefficients 
less than .961.  As with the ACRM results, the GLM and MLP models were 
the best performers, with all correlation coefficients exceeding .995.   
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
The purpose of the study was to compare DM methods against standard 
multiple regression methods using FOQA data on a fuel consumption study.  
The study examined several DM methods, and several performed very well 
in predicting fuel consumption.  In general, CR&T, GLM, MLP, and RBF 
methods performed much better than standard multiple regression methods 
in predicting the dependent variable.  As with other neural networks, 
interpretation of results is more difficult than with traditional statistical tools, 
and would require knowledge of the underlying theory.   
It was determined that DM holds great potential for exploring large 
datasets, such as are generated in a FOQA program, and learning more from 
the data than can be accomplished using standard statistical tools alone.  
Further, this project suggests that DM techniques might be utilized 
effectively on air carrier-generated datasets to improve operational efficiency 
and safety.   
The broader goal of this work is the creation of a practical tool that can 
be used by airlines to quickly identify aircraft with outlier fuel burns.   This 
is not a trivial problem.  While aircraft manufacturers provide detailed 
performance information and airlines routinely compute fuel consumption 
statistics for their fleets, the factors that contribute to any one flight’s fuel 
consumption are quite variable.  Differences between flights in load, cruise 
altitude, temperature and chosen cruise airspeed cause noticeable changes in 
fuel flow, making the identification of anomalous rates of fuel consumption 
difficult. 
The accuracy with which the GLM and MLP neural network models 
predict fuel flow give encouragement that these models, coupled with other 
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statistical tools such as process control charts, will enable the analyst to 
sensitively detect adverse trends, caused perhaps by out of trim conditions, 
improper loading, or engine foreign object damage.  Testing whether such a 
fuel consumption anomaly detector can be constructed is the next project in 
this research effort. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the accounting and stock price performance of two Canadian airlines, 
WestJet and Air Canada, over a five year period, taking into account the aftermath of the 
systemic shock to the airline industry produced by the September 11, 2001 (9-11), terrorist 
attacks and subsequent events such as the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the accompanying rise in jet fuel prices. Our study focuses on the viability of 
low-cost versus conventional-cost business models in Canada under the current business 
environment and the ability of airlines to withstand and effectively respond to catastrophic 
industry events.  Furthermore, we link the effectiveness of the airlines’ responses to these 
events to specific elements of their respective business models. We test our hypothesis 
through a case study. We focus on WestJet as a typical low-cost airline and compare its 
accounting and stock performance to Air Canada, a legacy carrier and rival in several 
business sectors.  We find WestJet to be much less affected by catastrophic industry events. 
By decomposing each airline’s return volatility, we observe that WestJet’s systematic and 
unsystematic risk increased only slightly during the industry’s post-9-11 turmoil when 
compared to Air Canada. In addition, we find that both WestJet’s accounting and stock 
performance have been highly superior to those of Air Canada.  We argue that WestJet’s 
business model provides the firm with significantly more financial and operational 
flexibility than its legacy rival, Air Canada.  WestJet’s lower operating costs, high 
consumer trust, product offering, corporate structure, workforce and work practices, as 
well as operational procedures are all factors that appear to contribute to its relative 
success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extant aviation literature includes several studies that discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the distinct business models employed by 
low-cost and full-service carriers.1  Earlier studies by Lawton (2002, 2003) 
discuss the strategies that both types of airlines have pursued in reaction to 
the September 11, 2001 (9-11) attacks and outline how those airlines have 
fared after 9-11. Although Lawton provides a brief review of the airlines’ 
stock performance, his discussion is mostly qualitative in nature.  Carter and 
Simkins (2004) provide a quantitative analysis of the stock performance of a 
sample of United States airlines to the events of 9-11, but do not focus on 
performance differences between low-cost versus full-service airlines. More 
recently, Flouris and Walker (2005a, 2005b) analyze performance 
differences between low-cost and full-service carriers in a risk-adjusted 
event study framework. All of these studies focus exclusively on the U.S. 
airline industry, however, and only consider the stock price performance of 
the sampled airlines. We add to the literature by providing the first 
comprehensive analysis of low-cost versus legacy carrier performance 
outside of the U.S. and by analyzing not only the stock price performance 
following such catastrophic events as 9-11 but also the impact of 9-11 and 
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the Republic of Cyprus to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and is a 
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University. 
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1 In line with other authors, we also use the terms legacy, conventional-cost, 
traditional-cost or full-fare when referring to full-service carriers and LCC 
or low-fare when referring to low-cost carriers. 
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similar events on the accounting performance and risk profile, that is, the 
systematic and unsystematic return volatility, of the affected airlines.  Our 
results are very consistent and provide interesting insights into the Canadian 
airline industry and into the differences between the two business models 
used by Air Canada and WestJet.  In addition, our small sample size allows 
for a firm-by-firm discussion of special circumstances that affect each 
airline.  These firm-specific discussions reveal several important facts that 
are usually not addressed in large-sample studies.  As such, our approach is 
consistent with earlier studies by Bowen, Castanias, and Daley (1983), Hill 
and Schneeweis (1983), Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992), and Lamb 
(1995) who employ small sample studies to investigate the impact of an 
event or a series of events on a firm’s performance and risk exposure. 
Given the existence of varied regulatory frameworks across countries, a 
comprehensive large sample analysis of the performance differences 
between two business models is likely to yield biased and inconsistent 
results. Thus, we follow the extant literature and employ a case study in 
which we focus on a set of two airlines which, aside from their business 
model, are largely comparable. As such, our study is part of a series of 
similar case studies employing small sample comparisons of airlines in one 
country at a time. 
Our methodological approach proceeds as follows. We first examine the 
short-term and long-term stock price performance as well as the accounting 
performance of WestJet and Air Canada during the post-9-11 period.2 We 
then analyze how 9-11 impacted the risk, that is, the systematic and 
unsystematic volatility of the airlines’ stock returns. We choose WestJet as a 
low-cost carrier representative and Air Canada as a firm that follows a full-
service business model. These two airlines are the only firms in the Canadian 
airline industry that are publicly traded. As such, our paper is a complete 
account of the Canadian airline industry in terms of the firms for which stock 
price and accounting data are available. 
When analyzing a firm’s accounting performance around a particular 
event we can gain valuable insights into how the event impacted the firm’s 
revenues, profitability, liquidity, as well as a variety of other performance 
measures.  Because such an analysis only employs historical data, however, 
                                                 
2 For brevity and expositional convenience we will hereafter refer to the pre-
9-11 and post-9-11 periods. It should be noted, however, that our study does 
not only consider the industry’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. Rather, the post-9-11 period also includes such critical events as 
the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
accompanying rise in jet fuel prices. Thus, our study focuses not on a single 
event but on a series of events that have dramatically altered the industry 
landscape in recent years. 
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it provides little insight into the expected future performance of the firm. To 
examine the impact of a catastrophic industry event on the future prospects 
of our sample airlines we analyze their stock performance before and after 
the event. Because stock market participants base their valuation of a 
company’s stock on the firm’s expected future cash flows rather than on 
historical information, an event study of a firm’s stock price performance 
reflects how the market as a whole anticipates the firm to do in the future. 
Lawton (2003) advances the argument that low-cost carriers were in a 
position to go on the offensive and aggressively exploit the changed industry 
climate after 9-11 by renegotiating labor contracts, by negotiating lower 
prices for new airplanes in what had suddenly become a buyer’s market for 
new aircraft, and by pursuing aggressive pricing strategies to increase their 
market share relative to legacy carriers. Legacy carriers, being exposed to a 
significantly higher overhead burden, were forced into defensive strategies 
that provided them with little operational flexibility. These developments are 
difficult to observe in the airlines’ accounting figures in the short term but—
if they are perceived to change a firm’s future cash flows—should be 
reflected in the market’s valuation of the firm’s stock.  
When investigating the impact of catastrophic industry events on each 
airline’s risk, we consider both the systematic and unsystematic volatility of 
the stocks’ returns. This allows us to differentiate between risk factors that 
affected the market as a whole and risk factors that affected the firms 
specifically. 
Although we employ only a small sample, our results are highly 
consistent.3  We observe that WestJet performed significantly better after 9-
11 than its mainstream competitor in almost all aspects of accounting 
performance. During 2001, arguably one of the worst years in global 
aviation history, WestJet remained profitable.  Only three airlines in the U.S. 
(JetBlue, Southwest, and Air Tran4) and a handful globally were also 
profitable in 2001.  In 2002, WestJet continued to fare better than its full-
service competitor.  In addition, its stock held up significantly better than the 
                                                 
3 Note that with a bigger sample, one could perform a regression analysis of 
the airlines’ accounting performance and abnormal returns after 9-11 on a 
variety of firm characteristics. This would allow for a more exact 
measurement of how each aspect of a firm’s operations contributes to its 
success or failure. Unfortunately, such an analysis is not possible given that 
there are not enough low-cost and conventional-cost carriers in either the 
U.S. or Canada to form a broad enough sample that would allow for such an 
analysis. Thus, our analysis focuses on examining a small sample of airlines 
that have clearly different business models but are otherwise comparable 
with respect to size and pre-9-11 performance. 
4 These airlines also follow different variations of a low-cost business model. 
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stock of Air Canada and showed a significantly smaller increase in 
unsystematic risk after 9-11.  Our discussion elaborates on the qualitative 
aspects that sets these airlines apart and drives their performance differences. 
Our findings provide empirical support for the qualitative discussion in 
Lawton (2003). In addition, they help explain the success of WestJet.  We do 
not advocate that the low-cost model is uniform in the way it manifests in the 
market.  Our argument is that the low-cost model, in its generic 
manifestation, can be differentiated from the full-service model along three 
management dimensions. They include adopting a viable strategic position, 
leveraging organizational capabilities, and reconceiving the value equation. 
These dimensions, coupled with the unique operational features that low-cost 
airlines have (pricing structure, fleet composition, route structure, choice of 
airports, distribution, and productivity) help explain, theoretically, why low-
cost carriers are in the position to outperform their full-service rivals. 
Zorn (2001) argues that low-cost carriers are more resilient than legacy 
carriers in times of economic downturn.  Our analysis focusing on WestJet’s 
performance validates this point, and Zorn’s analysis helps us demonstrate it 
theoretically.  Zorn cites several reasons for the resilience of low-cost 
carriers in times of recession: first, a lower overall and more variable cost 
structure; second, a lower breakeven load factor, and, third, business and 
leisure traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines to low-cost 
airlines.  Our financial analysis substantiates this point to its fullest.  We find 
that markets value low-cost airline stocks as growth stocks, whereas 
conventional-cost airline stocks are treated as cyclical.5  Even though 
affected, low-cost carriers emerged from 9-11 in a stronger market position 
than their full-fare rivals.  Given the Canadian evidence provided by this 
study, as well as the results of earlier U.S. studies by Flouris and Walker 
(2005a, 2005b) and anecdotal evidence from various other countries, our 
findings can likely be extended to the global airline industry in that the low-
cost model outperforms the legacy model across our study parameters in the 
way it responds to catastrophic industry events. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief description of 
WestJet’s business model and compare it to the business model of Air 
Canada.  We highlight several key aspects of WestJet’s strategy, and make 
comparisons across carriers that are representative of the successful low-cost 
business model. The following sections provide a description of the data and 
explain the methodology used to test several hypotheses concerning the 
                                                 
5 Although we only report results for WestJet in this study, the accounting 
and stock price performance of other North American low-cost airlines such 
as Southwest, Air Tran and JetBlue in recent years was also remarkable 
relative to most other airlines in the region. 
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accounting and stock performance of our sample airlines.  Results are 
presented. Findings are summarized in the final section. 
THE LOW-COST BUSINESS MODEL 
In this section we outline some of the common characteristics of the 
low-cost business model that WestJet and other LCCs such as easyJet, 
Ryanair, Southwest, JetBlue, and Air Tran have successfully employed in 
recent years.  Researchers such as Lennane (2000) have documented several 
advantages of the low-cost business model. Our goal in this study is to 
examine how and why low-cost carriers outperform legacy carriers in times 
of crisis.  While our empirical analysis focuses on WestJet, there is a large 
body of anecdotal evidence that suggests that other low-cost carriers—in 
several countries—have also fared significantly better after 9-11 than their 
full-service peers.6  There are many factors that set the low-cost business 
model apart from the full-service model.  Although it is impossible to 
determine to what degree each factor contributes to the continued out-
performance of low-cost carriers after catastrophic industry events, it is clear 
that the low-cost business model provides distinct advantages over the 
business model of full-service carriers in times of crisis.  We first summarize 
some of our empirical findings and then discuss the main differentiating 
factors between the two business models as they relate to our study. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that one of the primary factors that 
contributed to WestJet’s superior stock performance was its superior ability 
to cover both short-term and long-term liabilities. As we will discuss in more 
detail below, WestJet not only had a higher current ratio, that is, a healthier 
proportion of current assets relative to current liabilities, immediately prior 
to 9-11 but also a lower debt ratio.  Both factors likely put both bond and 
stock investors at ease as they could be somewhat confident that WestJet 
would not falter under the pressures that 9-11 put on the airline industry. In 
comparison, Air Canada had significantly fewer current assets on hand and 
was financially much more leveraged, which may have caused investors to 
shy away from it more quickly.  WestJet also benefited from considerably 
healthier profitability ratios prior to 9-11, as reflected in a higher return on 
assets and net profit margin.  Arguably, profitability is a good indicator of 
long-term liquidity. Thus, WestJet’s higher profitability likely reduced the 
perceived default risk for the firm even further.  Although WestJet already 
performed better pre-9-11 our results suggest that the performance gap 
widened even further afterwards. Naturally, the question arises about what 
may have caused WestJet’s out-performance of Air Canada. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Lawton (2003). 
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According to a Unisys Global Transportation report, “. . . the only 
prerequisite to economic success is to achieve a low cost base from which to 
build a desired service offering” (Unisys, 2003).  This statement dismisses 
claims by full-service airlines that industry malaise is due to exogenous 
factors such as terrorist threats, rising oil prices, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, or SARS and is valid vis-à-vis the Canadian airline industry experience.   
Since Air Canada acquired Canadian Airlines, the integration of the two 
companies did not produce the cost savings expected. Despite having over 
70% market share in Canada, the airline lost C$82 million in 2000, the year 
before 9-11 happened.  
Business models create a simplified description of the strategy of a 
profit-oriented enterprise. The low-cost airlines’ business model consists of a 
variety of characteristics, which includes price as its single most important 
product feature. In addition, most low-cost airlines are distinguishable from 
full-service carriers in terms of their product offering, corporate structure, 
workforce and work practices, and their operational procedures. 
We argue that most of these factors can also explain why WestJet and 
other low-cost airlines have done so well during the recent industry crisis 
when compared to full-service carriers.  The key qualitative factors that 
appear to set WestJet apart from legacy carriers such as Air Canada appear to 
be: (a) its focus on the core product (air transportation) without costly 
service offerings such as airport lounges, (b) the lower cost structure through 
the use of cheaper airports, online booking and a uniform fleet, (c) a lower 
and more flexible price structure, and (d) higher productivity through faster 
turnaround times and better use of its workforce.  
By boosting the profitability of WestJet and by having positive effects 
on other measures of accounting performance, irrespective of the industry 
climate, these factors translate into good performance even during difficult 
times for the airline industry. 
As our discussion points out, the full-service model employed by Air 
Canada, though reengineered after its emergence from bankruptcy protection 
in 2004, is still inherently inflexible (naturally) when confronted with sudden 
demand shocks and exposes the airlines to a significantly higher overhead 
burden that is difficult to cope with when unit sales, that is, bookings, drop. 
WestJet benefits from a lower overhead burden and more operational 
flexibility which allows it to weather difficult times better than its full-
service competitor.  
WestJet completed its initial public offering of 2.5 million common 
shares in July 1999 and transitioned to a public company.  The capital raised 
from the offering was used for the purchase of additional aircraft, as well as 
the building of a new head office and hangar facilities in Calgary.  In 
February of 2002, they offered an additional three million common shares 
yielding net proceeds of $78.9 million.  WestJet “celebrated its 27th quarter 
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of profitability with its third quarter 2003 results” (WestJet, 2007).  The 
following sections explore the performance differences quantitatively, both 
from an accounting standpoint and from the stock market’s perspective. 
DATA 
We use accounting data from January 2000 to December 2003.  We 
collected this data from year-end income statements and balance sheets, 
which are available online through Hoover’s Online database 
(www.hoovers.com). 
For our analysis of relative stock performances pre- and post-9-11, we 
use daily price data (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 
1999 to April 2004, which we retrieved from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 
(CRSP) database and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).7  To measure 
market performance during our sample period, we use the TSE 300 market 
index.  Finally, we use weekly data on annualized 3-month Treasury Bill 
yields as calculated by the Bank of Canada as a proxy for the risk-free 
interest rate during our sample period. 
METHODOLOGY 
Financial markets bring together potential investors who vote every day 
on the future profitability of the firm and the relative merits of managers’ 
strategic decisions.  Simply put, if investors think that corporate decisions 
will lead to increases in long-run profitability, news of events such as a 
takeover will cause a firm’s stock price to rise.  Conversely, news that 
investors believe will lower future profits will result in a fall in a firm’s 
equity value. 
The finance literature refers to the idea that news is quickly impounded 
in security prices as the efficient market hypothesis, first described by Fama, 
Fisher, and Jensen (1969).  The assumption that markets are efficient implies 
that security prices reflect all relevant information known to investors and 
thus provide us with the best estimate of a firm’s future profitability.  There 
is significant empirical support for the efficient market hypothesis including 
the Carter and Simkins’ (2004) study of airline stocks following catastrophic 
events. We add to Carter and Simkins’ findings by focusing specifically on 
performance differences between low-cost and traditional-cost airlines. In 
addition, our study is the first to examine the accounting performance of 
                                                 
7 Note that our sample period is naturally truncated by the fact that Air 
Canada filed for bankruptcy protection on April 1, 2004. Thus, we restrict 
our analysis to the stock price and accounting performance prior to that date. 
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Canadian airlines post-9-11, and to examine how 9-11 influenced the 
systematic and unsystematic volatility of their returns. 
If we assume that markets are efficient, and therefore set rational prices, 
we can measure whether the corporate strategy of a low-cost carrier such as 
WestJet, post-9-11, was in the best interest of shareholders by comparing the 
firm’s profitability and stock price performance in the months after 9-11 to 
the performance of an airline that follows a conventional-cost business 
model (Air Canada). 
  
Financial ratio analysis 
To evaluate the accounting performance of our sample airlines we focus 
on examining some of the most frequently used financial ratios. Financial 
ratios can be grouped into four categories: (a) liquidity ratios, (b) activity 
ratios, (c) financing ratios, and (d) profitability ratios. Liquidity ratios 
provide measures of a company’s ability to satisfy short-term obligations. 
Activity ratios measure a company’s efficiency in managing its assets. 
Financing ratios provide some indication of the riskiness of a company with 
regard to paying its long-term debts. Finally, profitability ratios assist in 
evaluating various aspects of a company’s profit-making activities.  
It is important to remember that when using financial ratios to assess the 
overall financial stability of a company, more than one ratio should be 
considered when formulating an accurate opinion. For example, a company's 
solvency ratios may be ideal, but if the ratios that help analyze profitability 
and activity are bad (profits are down and sales are stagnant), a much 
different opinion would be formulated.  
Our comparison employs both a cross-sectional and a time-series 
analysis. Cross-sectional analysis consists of comparing the financial ratios 
of different firms in the same industry at the same point in time. Time-series 
analysis consists of comparing the firms’ accounting performance ratios over 
time. 
Tyran (1986), Lev (1994) and Gibson (1997) describe a plethora of 
financial ratios that fall under the aforementioned categories. For briefness, 
we only report those ratios here that we feel to be most insightful.8  The 
                                                 
8 Note also that many ratios that are frequently used for manufacturing firms 
are of little importance in the airline industry. For this reason, we do not 
discuss such ratios as inventory turnover, accounts receivable turnover or 
accounts payable turnover. For the same reason, we do not differentiate 
between a firm’s current ratio and acid test ratio. The acid test ratio is similar 
to the current ratio but eliminates the inventory figure in the current assets 
section of the balance sheet. Given that inventory is typically negligible for 
airlines this differentiation provides little additional insight. 
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following list outlines the calculation of each ratio and discusses their 
meaning. 
 
Liquidity ratios 
Current Ratio. The current ratio measures the ability of the firm to pay its 
current bills while still allowing for a safety margin above the required 
amount needed to pay current obligations. We calculate the current ratio as 
Current Ratio = Current Assets / Current Liabilities. 
 
Activity ratios 
Total Asset Turnover. The total asset turnover is a measure of how 
efficiently and effectively a company uses its assets to generate sales. The 
higher the total asset turnover ratio, the more efficiently a firm’s assets have 
been used. We calculate the total asset turnover as Total Asset Turnover = 
Sales / Total Assets. 
 
Financing ratios 
Debt Ratio. This is a simple but effective ratio that indicates the firm's debt-
paying ability in the long run. The ratio represents the percentage of assets 
financed by creditors, and helps to determine how well the creditors are 
protected in case of insolvency. The higher the ratio, the greater the degree 
of outside financing by creditors. A high debt ratio indicates that the firm is 
more leveraged (has more debt) and is risky for creditors. We calculate the 
debt ratio as Debt Ratio = Total Liabilities / Total Assets. 
Interest Coverage Ratio. The interest coverage ratio (sometimes referred to 
as times interest earned) measures the ability of the firm to service all debts. 
The figure measures how many times interest payments could be made with 
a firm's earnings before interest expenses and taxes are paid. The higher the 
ratio, the more likely the firm can meet its obligations. We calculate the 
interest coverage ratio as Interest Coverage Ratio = Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes (EBIT) / Interest. 
Profitability ratios 
Net Profit Margin. The net profit margin measures the amount of profits 
available to shareholders after interest and taxes have been deducted on the 
income statement. We calculate the net profit margin as Net Profit Margin = 
Net Income / Sales. 
Return on Assets (ROA). The return on assets measures the firm's ability to 
utilize its assets to create profits by comparing profits with the assets that 
 Flouris & Walker 35 
 
 
generate profits. We calculate the return on assets as ROA = Net Income / 
Total Assets. 
Return on Equity (ROE). The return on equity measures the return earned on 
the owners’ equity in the firm. The higher the rate the better the firm has 
increased wealth to shareholders. We calculate the return on equity as ROE 
= Net Income / Stockholders’ Equity. 
Stock performance analysis 
To examine the impact of 9-11 on the stock performance of our sample 
airlines, we follow the event study procedure described in Brown and 
Warner (1985), Peterson (1989), and Schweitzer (1989).  Event study 
methodology measures the abnormal return of the stock, as the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return, around the time of the 
event.  If an announcement such as news of increased profits is taken as 
good news, abnormal returns will be positive, signaling the market’s belief 
that firm value has increased.  A negative abnormal return is evidence of bad 
news, indicating that the market believes the event will decrease the firm’s 
future profitability. 
To estimate the abnormal return of a stock on day t, we subtract the 
expected return on the stock from its actual return on that day:  
 ARt = rt – E(rt)                                             (1) 
where ARt is the abnormal stock return, rt is the actual stock return, and E(rt) 
is the expected stock return, all on day t.  In turn, we assume that the return 
of a stock is conditional on the return of the market and model E(rt) as: 
 ])([)( ,,, tftmttft rrErrE −+= β                             (2) 
where E(rm,t) is the expected return of the market on day t, rf,t represents the 
risk-free rate as measured by the return on 90-day Canadian Treasury Bills 
on day t, and βt is the estimated slope coefficient from a linear regression of 
the stock’s past returns on the returns of the market.9 
                                                 
9 Equation 2 is also called the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and is 
based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).  In this paper, we estimate the 
capital asset pricing model using both 60 and 360 daily returns that precede 
our event window.  We employ a linear market model that illustrates the 
relationship between an airline’s stock return and the market (as proxied by 
the TSE 300 index) during a normal period. 
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We calculate daily abnormal returns for WestJet and Air Canada post-9-
11.10  In addition, we measure cumulative abnormal returns, CARt,t+n , the 
sum of abnormal returns over a window of n days, as: 
 CAR ARt t n i
i t
t n
, +
=
+
= ∑                                                  (3) 
Cumulative abnormal returns enable us to measure the market’s reaction 
to the performance of the airline in a time frame that encompasses the entire 
period from the event under study to the present. 
Earlier industry research has largely focused on airline stock returns 
following a plane crash.  Davidson, Chandy, and Cross (1987), Lin, 
Thiengtham, and Walker (2005), and Pukthuanthong, Thiengtham, and 
Walker (2007) find statistically significant negative returns for airlines on 
the day of the crash.  This appears to be a short-term effect, however, and is 
reversed on the days following the event.  Chance and Ferris (1987) examine 
46 plane crashes, and discover that in 29 cases the carrier has a significant 
negative return.  A crash does not appear to have an effect beyond the initial 
reaction, nor does it affect the stock price of the airline’s competitors.  
Chance and Ferris also find a negative correlation between the airline’s 
abnormal return and the number of fatalities in the crash.11 
More recently, Carter and Simkins (2004) investigated the stock 
market’s reaction to 9-11.  They note the potential psychological effects of 
the attack and test whether financial markets react rationally to news of the 
event.  Carter and Simkins find that despite the psychological horrors the 
market was able to discern among airlines based on firm characteristics, 
including the ability to cover short-term obligations.  Their results support 
rational pricing and have important implications for our work. 
To serve as a further control in estimating the market’s reaction to 9-11, 
our analysis compares the abnormal returns of WestJet’s stock to the 
abnormal returns of Air Canada.  We choose WestJet because it is uses a 
low-cost business model, and Air Canada because it uses a conventional-cost 
model and has done so quite successfully.  These firms should provide a 
good benchmark for examining industry reaction to the set of relevant 
                                                 
10 Because Canadian stock markets were closed following 9-11 and did not 
reopen until September 13, 2001, we define September 13, 2001, as the first 
day of our post-9-11 event window. 
11 Other studies that examine the consequences of airplane accidents for 
airlines include Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988), Mitchell and Maloney 
(1989), and Bosch, Eckard, and Singal (1998). 
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events.  We do not consider CanJet and JetsGo12 because they are not 
publicly traded and Air Trans since it derives a significant portion of its 
revenues from chartered flights. 
Adjusting for risk 
In considering risk changes, we calculate beta, the part of a firm’s risk 
that is related to changes in the market.  It is a measure of systematic risk, 
the risk that investors must be compensated for, and, thus, is related to a 
firm’s cost of capital.  If 9-11 led to the airline industry being a more risky 
business, we would expect airlines’ betas to increase after 9-11.  An airline’s 
beta, βi, can be found by regressing the airline’s daily stock returns against 
the daily stock returns on the market as in the following regression model: 
 imii err ++= βα                                                                     (4) 
where α  is the intercept, iβ  is the slope coefficient that represents the 
sensitivity of the stock’s returns to the returns on the market, mr , and ie  
represents the firm-specific residual, that is, the part of a firm’s return that 
cannot be captured by the regression model. An alternative method for 
calculating a firm’s beta coefficient employs the following formula: 
 2mmii /)r,rcov( σβ =                                                               (5) 
where )r,rcov( mi  is the covariance between firm i’s returns and the 
returns on the market, and 2mσ  is the variance of market returns. Both 
Equation 4 and Equation 5 will result in the same beta estimates and may be 
used interchangeably. We use beta coefficients to adjust the expected returns 
in our event study for risk as in Equation 2 and to distinguish between a 
firm’s systematic and unsystematic return volatility as discussed below. 
Cornell, Hirshleifer, and James (1997) review many of the practical 
issues in beta selection and the application of regression-based asset-pricing 
models to estimating equity cost of capital. They provide assistance for 
resolving many of the conventional problems with beta estimation, such as 
selection of the risk-free rate, the time period for estimation, and the 
inclusion or exclusion of dividends. 
Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) perform direct statistical comparisons 
of beta estimates calculated by large financial data vendors such as 
Bloomberg, Compustat, Dow Jones, and Ibbotson. They find that the 
                                                 
12 Both of these airlines have ceased operations since the first draft of this 
paper was written.  
38 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
different procedures used by these commercial services produce the same 
results when simple tests of differences of means are used to evaluate them. 
They observe that most data vendors use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of the returns of the firm against those of the market, where the 
security's return serves as the dependent variable, and the independent 
variable is a user-selected index. They point out, however, that users of 
financial software packages typically have some flexibility and can select the 
time period for estimation, the market index against which they want to 
measure returns, the data frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), and 
whether they want to include dividends or not. 
Because the finance literature is divided on the issue whether short-term 
or long-term estimates should be used in CAPM estimation, we use a rolling 
window of both 60 and 360 calendar day returns to calculate covariances and 
variances.  Most authors and financial data vendors use long-term betas 
calculated over periods of three and more years, but given the rapidly 
changing environment for the airline industry, we found short-term estimates 
to be more appropriate. 
Expected market returns: Historical versus prospective estimates 
Before we can address the question of how we estimate expected market 
returns, we have to define the market.  In his famous critique of CAPM 
testing, Richard Roll (1977) indicates that the market portfolio to be used in 
CAPM estimation should contain all financial and non-financial assets 
available to investors and states that an accurate test of the CAPM will never 
be possible because of this requirement. 
Despite Roll’s criticism, most authors and financial data services use 
only country-specific common stocks to proxy for the market portfolio and 
rely heavily on the TSE 300 to represent the Canadian market. We follow 
this approach and use the TSE 300 market index for calculating both our 
beta estimates and market returns. 
When developing an estimate of the expected market return [E(rm)], one 
has to decide whether to use historical data, assuming that past performance 
is the best predictor of future performance, or make an attempt to forecast a 
return for the market, which would require an accurate estimate of future 
dividend growth. As with most other studies in this field, we do not consider 
ourselves wise enough to forecast future market returns, but rather rely on 
past returns as an estimate of future returns. Another question we had to 
address in our estimation was which time period to use to calculate past 
market returns. Given the fact that 9-11 occurred relatively recently and that 
our return data are thus limited, we decided to use the geometric average of 
market returns during the past 360 calendar days as an estimate of future 
market returns. To test the robustness of our results, we also calculated 60-
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calendar-day returns, but arrived at the same conclusions as we did with our 
long-term estimates. 
 
Systematic versus unsystematic volatility 
The systematic risk of a security is that part of the total risk that is 
associated with the movements in the underlying market. The unsystematic 
risk of a company’s stock is that part of total risk which is specific to that 
company. To examine the effect of 9-11 on both the systematic and 
unsystematic volatility of our sample firms, we partition the variance of a 
firm’s stock returns ( 2iσ ) into its two components, systematic variance 
( 22 mi σβ ) and unsystematic variance ( 2ieσ ), based on the formula: 
 2222
iemii
σσβσ +=                        (6) 
where iβ  and 2mσ  are as defined above and 2ieσ  represents the variance of 
the error terms, ie , in our regression model in Equation 4. 
An important statistic that emerges from the regression is the coefficient 
of determination R squared (R2). While the statistical explanation of the R2 is 
that it provides a measure of the goodness of fit of the regression, the 
economic rationale is that it provides an estimate of the proportion of the risk 
of a firm that can be attributed to market risk. The balance (1-R2) can then be 
attributed to firm-specific risk. 
There are two additional alternatives for calculating the R2 which we 
present here for completeness. One alternative illustrates the economic 
interpretability clearly: 
 2
22
2
i
miR σ
σβ=                                                                             (7) 
As we can observe, in this case the R2 is simply calculated by dividing 
the systematic risk of a firm’s returns by the total risk as calculated in 
Equation 6. The other alternative employs the correlation coefficient mi ,ρ  
between firm i’s returns and the returns on the market: 
 
mi
mi
mi
rr
σσρ
),cov(
, =                                                                 (8) 
where iσ  and mσ  represent the standard deviation of the returns for firm i 
and the market, respectively. 
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If we square the correlation coefficient mi ,ρ  we can observe that the 
term 2,miρ  is equivalent to the R2. Again, all three approaches may be used 
interchangeably and yield the same results.  As noted above, the R2 and (1-
R2) simply provide a proportional decomposition of a firm’s total variance 
2
iσ  into its two risk components, 22 mi σβ  and 2ieσ , and may be interpreted 
as percentage weights. 
RESULTS 
Accounting performance 
The first part of our analysis focuses on the relative performance of 
WestJet and Air Canada from an accounting standpoint, by comparing 
various accounting measures and financial ratios for the two firms over time. 
An analysis of the stock performance and return volatility of the two airlines 
follows in the next section. 
The accounting figures and financial ratios in the following table are 
based on year-end income statements and balance sheets from January 2000 
to December 2003 that we retrieved from Hoover’s Online database. As we 
can see, despite 9-11, WestJet managed to remain profitable on slightly 
declining sales, while Air Canada registered significant losses on falling 
revenues. 
WestJet’s current ratio is consistently above that of Air Canada and—
despite a slight decline in 2001 and 2003—improves significantly in 2003.  
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Table 1. Selected Accounting Data and Financial Ratios for WestJet and Air Canada 
Airlines, 2000-2003 
 
Time Period 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel A: 
WestJet     
Total Revenue 
(C$ Million) 332.5 478.4 680.0 859.6 
Net Income (C$ 
Million) 30.3 37.2 51.8 60.5 
Current Ratio 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.2 
Total Asset 
Turnover 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.6 
Interest 
Coverage Ratio 18.9 12.5 12.8 4.9 
Debt Ratio 46.3% 43.6% 54.6% 60.7% 
Net Profit 
Margin 9.1% 7.8% 7.6% 7.0% 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 9.0% 9.4% 6.6% 4.1% 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) 16.7% 16.7% 14.6% 10.4% 
Panel B: Air 
Canada     
Total Revenue 
(C$ Million) 9295.5 9,607.0 9,826.0 8,368.0 
Net Income (C$ 
Million) (112.5) (1,253.8) (828.0) (1,867.0) 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Total Asset 
Turnover 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 
Interest 
Coverage Ratio 0.0 -2.6 -1.0 -6.8 * 
Debt Ratio 102.2% 110.6% 130.9% 160.1% 
Net Profit 
Margin -1.2% -13.1% -8.4% -22.3% 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) -1.2% -14.1% -11.2% -27.0% 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Note. n.m. = not meaningful 
 
* As a result of its April 1, 2003, bankruptcy filing, Air Canada ceased to accrue interest on 
unsecured debt that is subject to compromise. While under creditor protection, Air Canada only 
reported interest expenses to the extent that they will be paid under the plan of arrangement or 
that it is probable that it will be an allowed claim. Approximately C$179 million of interest 
expense on unsecured debt would have been recorded in addition to the C$85 million on its 
income statement had the filings not occurred. We use the sum of these two numbers, that is, 
C$264 million, to calculate the interest coverage ratio in 2003. 
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A comparison of the activity ratios shows that WestJet’s asset turnover 
ratio weakens after the catastrophic industry events. This is not the case for 
Air Canada. A look at the financing ratios, however, points a very different 
picture for our sample airlines. Although WestJet’s interest coverage ratio 
drops significantly during our sample period (from 18.9 in 2000 to 4.9 in 
2003), the firm remains in a good position to cover its interest expenses.  On 
the other hand, the impact of 9-11 on the interest coverage ratio of Air 
Canada is tremendous: the airline had interest coverage ratios below 1 
throughout our sample period, indicating that they experienced significant 
difficulties in making their interest payments. This ultimately resulted in Air 
Canada’s bankruptcy filing on April 1, 2003. 
Even before 9-11, Air Canada had a significantly higher debt ratio than 
WestJet. In fact, throughout our sample period, Air Canada’s debt ratio 
exceeds 100%, fueled by a deficit in its shareholder equity. The high 
leverage and the accompanying financial risk are likely to be one of the 
reasons for the quick deterioration of Air Canada’s financial ratios. By 2003, 
the debt ratio of WestJet rose to 60.7% (from 46.3% in 2000). In 
comparison, Air Canada’s shareholder’s equity deficit grew so large that in 
2003 its debt ratio exceeded 160%. 
The profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and profit margin) of WestJet are 
comparatively healthy after 9-11, although they remain below the 
profitability levels that WestJet showed in 2000. In contrast, Air Canada 
shows very strong signs of weakening post-9-11.13 
Overall, our financial ratio analysis paints a grim picture for Air Canada 
while we observe only a slight deterioration in the accounting performance 
for WestJet. In its 2002 annual report, Air Canada emphasizes cost-cutting as 
one of the primary goals for the near future.  Because cost cutting measures 
and other managerial actions generally take some time to be reflected on a 
firm’s financial statements, it is difficult to determine their success through a 
short-term financial ratio analysis. If investors perceive such actions to be 
effective, however, they will be reflected in the financial performance of the 
firm’s stock. Since financial theory suggests that the price of a stock should 
be equal to the present value of all future dividends, a stock performance 
analysis generally provides a good insight into how the financial markets 
expect a firm to do in the future. 
For firms entering bankruptcy protection, a stock price analysis also 
provides a reasonable estimate of the market’s expectation about the future 
of the firm, that is, whether or not it can successfully emerge from the 
bankruptcy. Air Canada filed for bankruptcy protection on April 1, 2003. 
                                                 
13 Note that we do not report the return on equity (ROE) for Air Canada in 
Table 1. Given that Air Canada carries a deficit in shareholder equity on its 
balance sheet throughout our sample period, this ratio is not meaningful. 
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Thus stock prices after this date reflect investors’ consensus estimate of a 
successful emergence from bankruptcy. Although the firm successfully 
renegotiated labor contracts and locked in new financing arrangements 
(including a new C$850 million financing arrangement with Deutsche Bank 
and a C$250 equity million infusion by Cerberus Capital Management), any 
hopes of a stock price recovery were tainted when Air Canada received court 
approval to have its stocks cancelled. The company emerged from 
bankruptcy protection on September 30, 2004, and ACE Holdings, the new 
parent firm of the airline, quickly gained investor interest, with its Class B 
shares trading at C$35.75 at the end of December 2004—a premium of C$15 
above their offering price. Since then, the shares have traded largely 
sideways, closing at a price of C$33.98 on January 31, 2007. 
 
Stock performance and return volatility 
In order to examine how the financial markets reacted to 9-11 and 
whether investors put more confidence into low-cost carriers such as WestJet 
than into airlines that follow a conventional-cost model such as Air Canada, 
we examine the stock price performance of the two airlines pre- and post-9-
11. Table 2 presents quarterly and yearly returns for the airlines and the 
market as proxied by the TSE 300 index. 
The data clearly show the impact of 9-11 on the airline industry and the 
market. We observe a highly negative return for the airlines and the market 
index during the third quarter of 2001, followed by several quarters of high 
volatility when compared to the pre-9-11 period. Air Canada’s stock price 
declined by more than 58.3% in the third quarter of 2001, while WestJet’s 
stock dropped to a much lesser extent (31.5%). 
Since the returns in Table 2 are not adjusted for risk, we are not yet in a 
position to draw any conclusions about the significance of these performance 
differences. Before we can evaluate the impact of 9-11 on the risk-adjusted 
stock price performance of our sample airlines, we first examine how 9-11 
impacted the airlines’ beta coefficients and the systematic and unsystematic 
volatility of their returns. 
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Table 2. Quarterly and Yearly Return Data for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines,             
1999-2004 
Quarter WestJet Air Canada Market Index 
1999-Q1 N/A 8.94% 1.73% 
1999-Q2 N/A -7.46% 6.25% 
1999-Q3 21.61% * 61.29% -0.75% 
1999-Q4 22.70% 9.00% 20.93% 
1999 Total 22.16% 15.38% 6.72% 
2000-Q1 18.02% 42.20% 12.46% 
2000-Q2 53.37% 25.81% 7.75% 
2000-Q3 4.44% -22.56% 1.79% 
2000-Q4 -1.06% -9.27% -13.92% 
2000 Total 16.95% 5.88% 1.51% 
2001-Q1 -20.43% -42.34% -14.84% 
2001-Q2 31.62% 10.51% 1.69% 
2001-Q3 -31.50% -58.30% -11.60% 
2001-Q4 42.51% 37.91% 12.43% 
2001 Total 0.55% -22.20% -3.68% 
2002-Q1 25.16% 37.65% 2.12% 
2002-Q2 -30.25% 2.03% -8.99% 
2002-Q3 -12.29% -31.91% -13.51% 
2002-Q4 -11.26% -1.04% 7.02% 
2002 Total -9.21% -1.37% -3.69% 
2003-Q1 -2.79% -55.79% -4.10% 
2003-Q2 1.78% -36.19% 10.09% 
2003-Q3 52.07% -15.67% 6.27% 
2003-Q4 17.08% 17.70% 10.78% 
2003 Total 15.21% -27.26% 5.59% 
2004-Q1 -7.73% -0.75% 4.44% 
* Note that WestJet went public on July 13, 1999. Thus, our return calculations for the third 
quarter of 1999 are based on WestJet’s price data after that date, excluding its initial public 
offering (IPO) under pricing return of 25%. 
 
Risk analysis 
To measure differences in risk levels between the airlines and examine 
how those risk levels changed after 9-11, we first calculate beta coefficients 
for the airlines pre-9-11 and post-9-11 following the regression model in 
Equation 2. The resulting beta estimates are presented in Table 3. 
Undoubtedly, 9-11 had a significant impact on both the economy as a 
whole and the airline industry in particular. By differentiating between 
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systematic and unsystematic risk in Table 3 we can examine the impact of 9-
11 on return volatility in more detail.14 
Although Roll (1986) discusses the possibility that unsystematic 
volatility may be noise, or in his words “frenzy unrelated to concrete 
information” (p. 204), recent empirical evidence by Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000) and Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) provides support for the notion 
that firm-specific return variation gauges the extent to which information 
about a firm is quickly and accurately reflected in stock prices. 
Table 3. Stock Return Volatility Pre- and Post-9-11 for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines, 
Estimated Over Periods of 60 and 360 Days 
 WestJet Air Canada WestJet Air Canada 
 60 Calendar Days Pre-9-11 360 Calendar Days Pre-9-11 
Beta )( iβ  0.118 0.251 0.093 0.503 
Total risk )( 2iσ  6.76 6.25 6.71 10.45 
Systematic risk )( 22 mi σβ  0.01 0.04 0.02 0.58 
Unsystematic risk )( 2
ie
σ  6.75 6.21 6.69 9.87 
Proportion of systematic risk 
)( 22, Rmi =ρ  0.0013 0.0061 0.0029 0.0550 
Proportion of unsystematic 
risk )1( 2R−  0.9987 0.9939 0.9971 0.9450 
 60 Calendar Days Post-9-11 360 Calendar Days Post-9-11 
Beta )( iβ  1.106 2.169 0.790 1.467 
Total risk )( 2iσ  19.72 102.05 9.99 36.86 
Systematic risk )( 22 mi σβ  1.74 6.70 0.62 2.15 
Unsystematic risk )( 2
ie
σ  17.98 95.35 9.36 34.71 
Proportion of systematic risk 
)( 22, Rmi =ρ  0.0883 0.0657 0.0625 0.0584 
Proportion of unsystematic 
risk )1( 2R−  0.9117 0.9343 0.9375 0.9416 
 
                                                 
14 Note that a recent study by Hilliard and Savickas (2002) proposes an 
alternative method for examining the impact of an event on a firm’s 
unsystematic volatility. Preliminary tests on our sample suggested no 
significant quantitative or qualitative differences in the results under either 
method. For briefness, we limit our discussion to the method presented here. 
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Not surprisingly, we find that the beta coefficients of both airlines 
increased considerably after 9-11. During the 360 calendar days prior to 9-
11, WestJet had a beta of 0.093, compared to a beta of 0.503 for Air Canada. 
When performing the same analysis for the 360–day period after 9-11, we 
observe that WestJet’s beta increased to 0.79, while Air Canada had a post-
9-11 beta of 1.47. The differences are even more extreme when decomposing 
the airlines’ total return variation as in Equation 6. Here, we observe a 
significant increase in the total risk for each airline, especially for Air 
Canada. In addition, we observe that systematic risk accounts for a 
significantly larger proportion of total return variation in the post-9-11 
period. For WestJet, the increase is particularly large, as the coefficient of 
determination, R2, rises more than twenty-fold (from 0.0029 during the 360 
days prior to 9-11 to 0.0625 during the same period afterwards). For Air 
Canada, the increase in the systematic risk component is approximately 
6.1%. 
Overall, we observe that the return variability for Air Canada appears to 
be primarily driven by firm-specific, that is, unsystematic, risk factors. The 
returns for WestJet, on the other hand, appear to be more and more driven by 
market wide risk factors. 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from our volatility 
analysis. First, the betas of both sample airlines have increased significantly, 
and are particularly high for Air Canada. With a beta of 0.093 prior to 9-11, 
WestJet showed little dependency on the overall market. Even though its 
beta remains below 1, it is now much more affected by return fluctuations in 
the market. If the betas remain at these elevated levels and the CAPM holds, 
then we can expect both airlines to be significantly more sensitive to the 
overall market than prior to 9-11. 
Second, although the total risk of each airline has increased significantly 
after 9-11, the proportion of systematic risk increased for both airlines, 
particularly for WestJet. This suggests that market volatility has a much 
bigger influence on the return of each airline and bodes well for poorly 
diversified investors or sector-specific funds as—according to the CAPM—
they should get rewarded for a larger proportion of the total risk they bear. 
 
Risk-adjusted stock performance 
To calculate how the returns compare between the airlines after 
adjusting for risk, we employ event study methodology and calculate the 
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for each airline pre- and post-9-11 
in a CAPM framework. We use 90-day treasury bill rates as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate and historical market returns based on 60 and 360 calendar 
days to forecast expected market returns. Table 4 presents non-risk-adjusted 
returns of the airlines for various time periods after 9-11. 
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We observe that both airlines were negatively impacted by 9-11, with 
Air Canada performing the worst, losing over 23% on the first trading day 
following 9-11 and over 78% during the following 30 months. In 
comparison, WestJet lost only 12% on the first trading day after 9-11 and 
actually gained 58% within 30 months after the event. Both airlines show a 
medium-term recovery three to six months after 9-11, followed by a repeated 
downturn after 18 months, from which Air Canada was never able to 
recover. 
Table 4. Non-Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11, for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines 
Non-Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
Time Elapsed Since 9-11 WestJet Air Canada Market 
1 Day * -12.3% -23.1% -3.3% 
1 Week -22.9% -33.6% -5.9% 
2 Weeks -14.9% -45.3% -11.3% 
1 Month -2.9% -64.1% -3.9% 
2 Months 12.5% -41.9% -1.6% 
3 Months 24.7% -22.2% 2.5% 
6 Months 62.9% 2.5% 7.7% 
1 Year 4.7% -13.3% -9.9% 
18 Months -8.6% -55.6% -14.3% 
2 Years 41.9% -78.9% 3.5% 
30 Months 58.3% -78.3% 19.1% 
* Note that the Canadian markets were closed for two business days following September 11, 
2001. Thus, we calculate 1-day performance as the return from the close of trading on 
September 10 to the close of trading on September 13, 2001. 
 
Table 5 presents risk-adjusted returns following 9-11 using 60-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums estimated using 60-day historical 
returns. Although negative in the short run, we find that the risk-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for WestJet are positive in the medium 
and long run (1 to 30 months after 9-11). Although Air Canada shows some 
positive CARs in the medium term (3 months to 1 year after 9-11), they 
become negative in the long run. 
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Table 5. Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11 Using Short-Term Estimates, for WestJet 
and Air Canada Airlines 
Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
(Using 60-Day Trailing Betas and Market Risk Premiums Estimated Using 60-Day 
Historical Returns) 
Time Elapsed Since September 11, 2001 WestJet Air Canada 
1 Week -24.48% -34.86% 
2 Weeks -4.79% -59.47% 
1 Month 2.84% -86.37% 
2 Months 22.08% -23.89% 
3 Months 34.46% 13.77% 
6 Months 73.60% 16.46% 
1 Year 40.56% 20.84% 
18 Months 35.27% -17.43% 
2 Years 73.99% -58.80% 
30 Months 64.40% -65.00% 
 
Table 6 presents a long-term approach for estimating the inputs in our 
CAPM model. Here, we calculate risk-adjusted returns by using 360-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums based on 360-day historical returns. 
Table 6. Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11 Using Long-Term Estimates, for WestJet 
and Air Canada Airlines 
Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
(Using 360-Day Trailing Betas and Market Risk Premiums Estimated Using 360-Day 
Historical Returns) 
Time Elapsed Since September 11, 2001 WestJet Air Canada 
1 Week -24.71% -35.41% 
2 Weeks -5.58% -61.91% 
1 Month 1.04% -89.91% 
2 Months 17.42% -29.56% 
3 Months 28.97% 6.47% 
6 Months 63.32% 35.27% 
1 Year 27.24% 3.41% 
18 Months 23.34% -4.63% 
2 Years 75.24% -20.20% 
30 Months 67.06% -52.38% 
 
 Flouris & Walker 49 
 
 
The results are similar to those presented in Table 5: WestJet clearly 
outperforms Air Canada on a risk-adjusted basis after 9-11. It is noteworthy, 
however, that Air Canada’s underperformance is somewhat tamed when we 
use long-term estimates in our calculations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding the fact that WestJet has been an innovative operation 
and, as the numbers and our analysis shows, has been quite successful even 
during difficult times, will it be able to maintain its success in the future?  
Will customers continue to remain loyal? Will the firm prevail in case 
investor confidence if the aviation industry deteriorates even further?  Will 
the firm prevail if serious safety concerns arise about its operation or the 
operation of low-cost carriers in general? 
Besides WestJet in Canada, other low-cost airlines such as Virgin Blue 
in Australia, AirAsia in Malaysia and Thailand, RyanAir and easyJet in 
Europe, and JetBlue and Southwest in the U.S. have been similarly 
successful. In Canada, we may see the emergence of additional low-cost 
airlines.  Also, legacy carriers such as Air Canada have worked very hard to 
reinvent themselves as low-cost airlines.  Especially in North America, 
currently, the service offering of LCCs and legacy airlines is virtually 
identical in regard to their domestic service, with legacy airlines still offering 
an international and in some cases global network as a significant point of 
differentiation with LCCs that typically have limited or no international 
networks. 
We explain WestJet’s overall success from an operational standpoint. 
WestJet has a lower and more variable cost structure and a lower breakeven 
load factor, which allows it to react to a changing environment more quickly 
than conventional airlines. In addition, WestJet benefits from the migration 
of leisure and even business travelers from conventional-cost airlines to low-
cost airlines.  Our financial analysis substantiates these qualitative 
observations.  Financial markets appear to have more confidence in the 
flexibility and continued growth potential of WestJet than its traditional-cost 
counterpart Air Canada (which is treated as cyclical).  Even though affected, 
WestJet and similar low-cost carriers in the U.S. emerged from such crises as 
9-11, the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, rising jet 
fuel prices, and temporary demand declines caused by heightened fear of 
additional terrorist attacks in a stronger market position than their 
conventional-cost rivals (see also Flouris & Walker, 2005a, 2005b).  From a 
management standpoint, we believe that adopting a viable strategic position, 
leveraging organizational capabilities, and reconceiving the value equation 
are critical in defining the comparative advantage of low-cost carriers. 
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ABSTRACT 
The concept of introducing a no-frills airline to the wealthy Arab region presented 
its risks.  This independent study sought to position the new airline in the 
marketplace. After three focus groups and 400 self-administered surveys, safety 
(#1) and price (#2) are low-fare carrier considerations whereas safety (#1), 
punctuality (#2) and price (#3) apply for full-fare airlines. Recommended ways for 
the no-frills carrier to reach the market include newspaper ads, travel agent sales, 
online bookings, and call centers.  Additionally, respondents appeared to evaluate 
this low-fare carrier as if it is a full-service airline. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The no-frills sector of the airline industry has become more established, 
which has resulted in increasing competition between low-cost and full-
service carriers. Attention has focused on the successes and failures of the 
no-frills airlines; their operations have been analyzed, compared and 
reviewed (Gilbert, Child & Bennett, 2001; Jarach, 2004; Lawton, 2003). The 
successful Southwest airlines model has often been the benchmark for no-
frills operations throughout the world (Leavy, 2003), and the template 
continues to be copied in many countries (Jarach, 2004). The announcement 
that the low-fare, no-frills model was being introduced into the oil-rich 
Middle East market appeared to be a contradiction.  
This study focused on consumer response to the no-frills carrier, Air 
Arabia, beginning its air service from Sharjah airport in United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). The research was guided by two objectives. First, would 
the traveling public be receptive to the low-fare airline? Second, would eight 
typical factors used by customers when considering a full-service carrier 
have (dis)similar responses when the no-frills airline was an option? The 
startup presented a window of opportunity to pursue a study about the 
western culture low-cost, no-frills airline template being introduced to the 
Arab world for the first time. Additionally, Air Arabia was entering a market 
that was already dominated by Emirates Airlines, one of the world’s best. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A low-cost airline business model is typically a niche strategy. "It is 
aimed at getting benefit from offer vacuums and from the service for pariah 
customers, starting from visiting friends and relatives, ethnic and leisure 
based movements and later climbing up to reach cost-conscious business 
travelers" (Jarach, 2004, p. 25). The emphasis on costs makes the distinction 
between full-service and no-frills. Jarach explained that the low-fare, low-
cost operations require "a much more radically deeper reengineering of the 
entire value proposition and are not definitively sensitive only to one shot 
actions" (p. 26).  
If an airline is classified as a low-cost carrier, then it must pursue a low-
cost operational structure. This means offering fares lower than the full-
service scheduled airlines’ ticket prices (Gilbert, Child & Bennett, 2001). 
Combining comparative tables about full-fare and low-fare airlines (Gilbert, 
Child & Bennett, 2001, p, 314; Lawton, 2003, p. 178) noted that no-frills 
carriers were distinguished by few if any amenities and point-to-point 
transportation (see Table 1). 
 
 McKechnie, Grant & Fahmi 55 
 
 
A low-cost carrier will take market share from an incumbent at market 
entry in addition to carving out a new market space (Jarach, 2004; Lawton, 
2003). However, pursuing a low price strategy has the potential to put the 
company at risk (Garda & Marn, 1993). Thus, low-cost carriers’ marketing 
strategies include advertising and promotions concentrated in secondary 
airports’ catchment areas to building a corporate culture that is fun and 
exciting for passengers (Gilbert, Child & Bennett, 2001).  
Table 1. Comparison of Characteristics of Low-Fare Airlines and Full-Fare Airlines 
Low-fare Airline Full-fare Airline 
Simple brand-low-fare Complex brand—price + service 
Online and direct booking 
Reservations by telephone and Internet 
Mainly travel agents 
Simple ticket price structure and ticket less  
check-in 
Complex fare structures 
Tickets produced for each booking 
Use of secondary, low-charging airports (some 
exceptions) 
Located around major population centers 
Focus on primary airports 
High aircraft utilization—quick gate turnaround time Lower utilization of aircraft 
Do not interline; point-to-point service 
Offers non-stop routes 
Interlining important part of service; hub 
and spoke services 
Simple product—all additional services and facilities 
charged for, e.g., credit card bookings, late check-in, 
meals 
Complex integrated service product(s), 
e.g., ticket flexibility, business lounges, 
frequent flyer program 
Focus on ancillary revenue generation—advertising 
(‘the plane as a billboard’), on board retailing (more 
common in Europe) 
Focus on primary product 
Mainly short-haul focus Short and long haul 
Common fleet type acquired at very good rates 
Single type of aircraft 
Single class configuration 
Mixed fleet 
 
Cabins are usually divided into two or 
three classes to allow for different degrees 
of in-flight service 
No complimentary in-flight meal service Complimentary in-flight meal and drink(s) 
Aggressive yield management by implementing 
various price levels and capacities depending on load 
factors and when tickets are purchased 
Yield management by filling up set-price 
classes in order of bookings 
Minimum cabin crew on board 
Only operate core activities. Outsource most 
operations 
Cabin crew more numerous as required 
Less outsourcing of operations 
 
Low ticket prices do not preclude no-frills carriers being concerned 
about value propositions that satisfy passengers’ needs and wants (Lawton, 
2003). Regular industry surveys question whether people are willing to fly 
with a low-cost airline. They focus on efficiency factors such as punctuality, 
scheduling, seating, and routes (Gilbert, Child & Bennett, 2001). Measuring 
willingness to fly alternately addresses the uncertainty felt by the public 
when choosing to travel by air (Lawton, 2003).  
Beyond the basic efficiency factors, Bruning (1997) identified that 
customers’ choice was also affected by country of origin and national 
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loyalty. The traditional one carrier, one flag carrier model (Jarach, 2004, p. 
29) identified that an airline’s country-of-origin cued passenger expectations 
which in turn contributed to the carrier’s reputation. Bruning (1997) 
explained that national loyalty stemmed from ethnocentrism and reference 
group manifestations that linked to in-group identity. Country of origin was 
the cue held globally whereas national loyalty stemmed from the felt identity 
of those who lived in the country or those who were born to the country. 
METHODOLOGY 
The study 
Data collection for this study was conducted in two stages. The first 
stage was three focus group discussions. The second stage was a self-
administered survey distributed throughout various public locations, that is, 
shopping malls and coffee houses, in the two emirates of Dubai and Sharjah. 
 
Focus groups 
Five people participated in each of the three focus groups. The first 
group was of single people still living at home but likely to use the airline for 
travel to visit relatives. The second group was of couples where one or both 
potentially traveled to nearby countries on business and/or purchased air 
travel for family holidays. The third group was of students living in the 
university dormitory who traveled by air between home and school. The 
groups were chosen following the literature search as likely passenger 
segments that would consider flying no-frills (Jarach, 2004). Low-fare, no-
frills air travel was being introduced to the region for the first time when this 
study took place. Topics discussed included customers’ expectations, 
concerns and likelihood of traveling with a no-frills airline.  
The focus group respondents felt that the startup airline would appeal to 
three groups of people: (a) the price sensitive, that is, the UAE working class 
who have low household income levels and the laborer expatriates who 
travel only to their home country for vacations; (b) the frequent flyers, that 
is, students traveling to home during holiday periods and business travelers 
whose companies were locally rather than internationally based; and (c) the 
leisure travelers, that is, families flying to vacation destinations.  
The focus group discussants concluded that that the most likely 
passengers would be the frequent flyer students and leisure travelers. The 
close proximity of the UAE to other countries in the region means students 
can fly home for weekend visits; quick trips are not a burden to the family 
financial resources. It was not feasible to include laborers as respondents. 
The cultural barriers that surround laborer employment mean that they work 
long hours, six or more days a week; they return to their barrack type 
housing by company bus at the end of the day. 
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Questionnaire 
Questionnaire development followed the focus group sessions. The 
survey instrument asked about eight factors: (a) price of the ticket, (b) social 
class of fellow passengers, (c) punctuality of on-time departures and arrivals, 
(d) time that flights were scheduled to depart/arrive, (e) safety, (f) service on 
board, (g) seat size and spacing, and (h) entertainment facilities offered on 
the aircraft. Answer options were a 5-point Likert scale with 1 meaning not 
very important to 5 meaning very important and 3 meaning neutral. 
Respondents were asked to consider the eight factors as independent. Each 
factor was given equal weight. 
The eight factors were set in two sets of questions. The first group 
related to traveling with any airline (eight factors, any airline). The second 
set referred to traveling with a no-frills carrier (eight factors, no-frills). The 
two sections were separated to prevent respondents from duplicating their 
replies from one series of factors to the other. The questionnaire was pre-
tested by ten people from the sample population. Minor changes were made 
before the final self-administered document was distributed. Convenience 
was the primary sampling method although judgment of the fieldworkers 
was also required. 
 
Analysis 
The data was first explored for normalcy. It was not normally distributed 
according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk tests; the p value 
was < .05. Had the p value been non-significant, > .05, then it would have fit 
the criteria for normal distribution (Field, 2000). Two non-parametric tests 
were used: chi-square for goodness of fit and the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
test for comparing two sets of scores from the same subjects. Mean and 
median were obtained for the eight factors, any airline, and the eight factors, 
no-frills. 
THE FINDINGS 
The respondents 
The demographic questions were limited to age, marital status, where 
respondents lived and the frequency of travel. Regarding age, 47% were 21 
years or younger, 32% were 22-35 years and 21% were 36 years and older; 
the percentages reflected the country demographics. For marital status, 62% 
were single and 38% were married or divorced. Less than 30% of the 360 
respondents lived in university residences. Selecting one or more of the three 
reasons respondents would travel by air, they said (a) flying home, including 
visits to relatives, (88%); (b) flying for holiday travel (56%); and (c) flying 
for business (19%). The UAE population is dominated by expatriates, which 
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explained the high percentage of those flying home. The UAE geographic 
location means frequent vacation trips to other countries are accessible and 
quite common, which accounted for the high percentage of those flying for 
holiday. Thus, the respondents were representative of the potential 
passengers who would travel with an airline that served nearby destinations.  
 
Segmenting by age, income and frequency of travel 
The variable "would consider flying no-frills" was cross tabulated with 
age. As shown in Table 2, the break point for decreasing percentages was 21 
years and younger, (75% saying yes) and 22 years and older (67% saying 
yes). In the regional culture, which includes Arabs and South Asians, people 
marry at a young age and by the end of the university years they have family 
responsibilities. Before graduation, air travel is typically paid by parents who 
choose low fare options. Later, when purchasing their own tickets, people 
seek the Arab hospitality service standards offered by full-service airlines. 
Although the chi-square was not significant, the p value was close at .052 for 
the cross-tabulation.  
As noted in Table 2, the willingness to fly no-frills decreased as 
respondents’ income increased. Those earning less than 5,000 UAE Dirhams 
(AED) per month (AED5,000 = US$1,370.00) said they would likely fly no-
frills (80%). Similar percentages were obtained for the other income 
categories: AED5,001-10,000 (70%) and AED10,001-15,000 (71%). In the 
AED15,001+ per month income group only 46% said they would consider 
flying no-frills. Chi-square for "would consider flying no-frills" and income 
was significant at p = .000. 
As indicated in Table 2, the three categories for travel frequency (flying 
home, flying for holiday and flying for business) were cross tabulated with 
the variable "would consider flying no-frills." Respondents were less likely 
to consider the no-frills option as the number of trips per year increased. The 
break point for flying home was 1-3 trips per year (75%); flying for holiday 
was 1-2 trips (50%) and flying for business, 1 trip (18%). Chi square was 
significant at p = .034 for traveling for holiday and p = .001 for traveling for 
business. 
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Table 2. Percentage of respondents who would consider flying no-frills by age, income and 
travel frequency 
Age  % Yes 
(in years) 
Income % Yes 
(in AED) 
Travel frequency  % Yes 
(trips per year) 
21 & younger 75% 
22 & older 67% 
< 5000    80% 
5001-10000   70% 
10001-15000  71% 
15001 +      46% 
Flying home 
0 trips  12% 
1-3 trips 75% 
4+ trips 13% 
 
 
For holiday 
0 trips   45% 
1-2 trips  50% 
3+ trips   5% 
For business 
0 trips  82% 
1+ trips 18% 
p = .052 p = .000  p = .034 p = .001 
 
Factors to consider – product and price 
The eight usage factors focused on elements of product and price. Data 
analysis was conducted first for the any airline group. Next, the no-frills 
group was considered. All were framed in individual questions "how 
important is factor to you, on a scale of 1-5." The results, as reported in 
Table 3, include: (a) percentage of respondents who selected important or 
very important (answer options 4 and 5), (b) the mean and median of the 1-5 
scale; (c) the position ranking the mean of each factor closest to the very 
important (answer option 5) end of the scale; (d) standard deviation; and (e) 
cross-tabulation of factor importance with yes responses to variables "would 
consider flying any airline" or "would consider flying no-frills." 
 Airline safety was the most important factor to respondents, regardless 
of the carrier type (4.22 mean, SD 1.063 for any airline and 4.18 mean, SD 
1.057 for no-frills). The factor of least concern was entertainment facilities 
(3.21 mean, SD 1.182 for any airline and 3.12 mean, SD 1.234 for no-frills). 
Overall, the mean responses for the any airline factors were incrementally 
higher in importance, that is, closer to 5.0, than what respondents had to say 
about the no-frills factors. Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the internal 
reliability of the sixteen factors with a result of .803. 
For any airline, punctuality (mean 3.95, SD .957) was the second 
highest rated factor (closer to 5.0), followed by ticket price (mean 3.91, SD 
.961) at third. For a no-frills carrier, ticket price (mean 3.94, SD 1.053) was 
the second highest rated factor and punctuality (mean 3.83, SD .991) was 
third. The other factors, that is, social class of fellow passengers, time that 
flights were scheduled to depart/arrive, service on board, seat size/seat 
spacing and entertainment facilities held the same fourth to eighth position 
for both any airline and a no-frills airline. But there was significant statistical 
difference with ticket price, social class of other passengers, punctuality, 
flight timings, service and seat spacing. 
The Wilcoxon non-parametric test for two related samples determined 
that three factors (see Table 3) had z scores with significant p values: price (z 
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= -2.095, p = .036), punctuality (z = -2.221, p = .026) and service (z = -
2.770, p = .006). The test statistic for each was based on the positive ranks. 
This concluded that when respondents were choosing to fly any airline, then 
price, punctuality and service were more likely to be considered and 
compared as a means of obtaining the best fare and service options. 
Alternately, when choosing to fly a no-frills airline, passengers already knew 
what to expect (for price, it was low-fare, for punctuality, the flights were 
point-to-point, and for service, it was no-frills). Additionally, the more 
robust parametric paired samples test was run for the two sets of eight 
factors. Significant p values were obtained for price (t = 2.121, p = .035), 
punctuality (t = 2.222, p = .027) and service (t = 2.753, p = .006). 
The dichotomous yes-no question "would you consider flying Air 
Arabia" was cross tabulated with each of the eight factors for any airline and 
then for a no-frills airline. For any airline, chi square significance was 
obtained for price (p = .000), punctuality (p = .015), service on board (p = 
.004) and seat spacing (p =.013). For a no-frills airline, chi square 
significance was obtained on the following cross-tabulations: price (p = 
.004), other passengers (p = .014), punctuality (p = .036), flight timings (p = 
.009), service on board (p = .030) and seat spacing (p = .023). Only safety 
and entertainment did not have significant p values. 
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Reaching the market – promotion and place 
Promotion activities that would reach the target marketing were required 
when no-frills air travel was being introduced to the Arab region. 
Respondents favored advertisements through newspapers (80%) and 
television (64%). Directed promotion to specific target segments received 
limited support. For example, campus or university publications were 
supported by only 30% of the student-aged respondents while respondents in 
business (29%) felt that business magazines had limited value. 
The preferred communication medium for making reservations was 
through a travel agent (58%). This was followed by booking online (51%). 
Speaking to an agent at a call centre was third (48%).  Chi square 
significance (p = .001) was obtained for the cross-tabulation age and booking 
online. Two groups, 21 years and younger (52%) and 22-35 years (62%), 
indicated higher preferences for reserving air travel via the Internet than did 
the 36 years of age and older segment (34%). 
DISCUSSION 
Given that it was only days before the airline commenced flights, 
surprisingly 46% had not heard of the airline. However, when told of the 
startup, 40% expected the airline to be successful while 35% said they did 
not know. In the marketplace, it was noticeable that promotional activities, 
including advertising and news releases, were scarce. The Internet site for 
reservations was made operational only a few short weeks before the first 
flight; the call centre was opened only two weeks in advance. A multi-page 
insert in an Arabic version of a local newspaper announced when flight 
operations had begun. No insert was included in the English language 
version of the same paper. Thus, a large consumer segment was excluded as 
the target from the promotional material.  
Response to the importance of the eight factors, for both any airline and 
no-frills, cross tabulated with the variable "would you consider flying Air 
Arabia" indicated that respondents assessed Air Arabia similar to any airline 
when considering ticket price, punctuality and safety (see Table 3). The 
findings implied initial hesitation towards Air Arabia until the traveling 
public was more familiar with the carrier or until the airline built its 
reputation.  
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for the eight factors, 
any airline and the eight factors, no-frills identified significant z scores for 
price, punctuality and service, based on positive ranks. The interpretation 
was that respondents expected low fares from a no-frills carrier. Customers 
were more likely to question the ticket prices being charged by a full-service 
carrier. The same for service; the traveling public knew what to expect from 
a no-frills carrier, but comparatively assessed the service offerings when 
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flying full-service. For punctuality, respondents were more likely to question 
whether flights arrived/departed on-time for full-service than for no-frills. 
Since the low-cost airline was point-to-point, it stands to reason that 
punctuality would not be as critical. On the other hand, if making 
connections, departure/arrival punctuality would be an important factor. 
It was not unexpected that respondents preferred to make travel plans 
through agents. Ticket fare structure can be discounted at the point of 
purchase in the UAE, and travel agents tend to engage in discounting. The 
low response to promotions through student media and business publications 
indicated that the mass market appeal of newspapers was the more likely 
medium used by the traveling public when searching for fare specials and 
holiday flights.  
As noted previously in this paper, the sequence of the eight factors for 
any airline was the same for the eight factors for a no-frills airline for 
position one and positions four through eight. This was an indication that the 
traveling public has many points of reference to be satisfied regardless of 
airline type. Additionally, the cross-tabulation of "would consider flying no-
frills" with the eight factors produced chi square significant results for all 
except safety and entertainment on board. Arguably, this indicated that the 
respondents had high customer satisfaction expectations about the Air 
Arabia startup. 
Overall, respondents appeared to be more critical of the new carrier, Air 
Arabia. The question was whether country-of-origin and national loyalty 
cues had contributed to their critical answers. The UAE is made up of seven 
emirates; each functions to some extent as its own country. Each emirate has 
its own cultural identity and government under the umbrella auspices of the 
richer, more established emirate of Abu Dhabi. Air Arabia established 
operations from the Emirate of Sharjah, which is less westernized and 
modern than its neighbor, Dubai. Sharjah also carries a stigma that it is 
regressive and restrictive due to the conservative dress codes and alcohol 
prohibition. The fact that respondents appeared to set higher standards for 
the no-frills startup suggested that country-of-origin cues (Air Arabia 
originating from Sharjah) influenced the results. National loyalty (pride in a 
national carrier) would be expected to offset country-of-origin concerns. If 
this had been the case, there would have been fewer significant chi-square 
cross-tabulations when the traveling public considered whether to fly Air 
Arabia.  
When considering the potential market segments available to the low-
fare, no-frills carrier, age and income were strong demographic factors: the 
lower the age and the lower the income, the more likely to use. However, 
this does not preclude attracting passengers from other segments as noted in 
the results. At the time of writing, Air Arabia has seemingly acknowledged 
the age variable given that their marketing now incorporates South Park-type 
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characters attired in traditional Arab garments. Linking the adult animation 
figures to the Arab culture in such a way may arguably be considered as 
country-of-origin or national unity cues. 
 
Limitations and future research 
No study, including this one, is without limitations. Central to the 
research were the eight factors as they applied to any airline and to no-frills 
service. Each was approached as being independent and isolated one from 
the other. Under actual conditions, people searching for air travel may 
incorporate two or more and thus weight each differently rather than equally. 
A more in-depth examination of the factors would provide valuable insight 
about passenger preferences when no-frills air service is a travel option. 
Additionally, the eight factors were not all encompassing; this study focused 
on the ones most common from the literature (Gilbert, Child & Bennett, 
2001) and likely the most fundamental.  
Future studies would include gender and nationality. Had these 
demographics been included, more information would have been available 
about consumer segments. It may be argued that the sample was not truly 
representative of the population. Being aware that convenience and judgment 
sampling presented this risk, every effort was made to approach a variety of 
people to overcome the bias. 
The timing of the study had its limitations. Air Arabia was about to 
launch and yet the public was largely unaware of the startup. This weakness 
was offset by the fact that respondents based their answers on personal 
reflection. Respondents had not been swayed by marketing efforts 
announcing the new carrier. The next research would involve the same set of 
eight factors studied more in-depth. Country-of-origin and national loyalty 
would be key issues to pursue. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the research results supported the view that Air Arabia would 
be able to compete successfully in the Arab region over the long term. 
Respondents, representing the traveling public expressed their willingness to 
consider a low-fare, no-frills option when making air reservations. 
Additionally, they expressed their confidence in the startup as noted in the 
similar percentages attributed to the eight factors, any airline and the eight 
factors, no-frills. No factor had results that indicated uncertainties and/or 
generated negative comparisons with full-service carriers. 
The findings indicated that Air Arabia had the opportunity to pursue a 
greater share of the traveling public market through (a) increasing 
promotions to create awareness and (b) addressing the factors that concerned 
people when considering an airline. For example, the initial marketing 
 McKechnie, Grant & Fahmi 65 
 
 
efforts could have given safety assurances by mentioning that (a) 
experienced Canadian pilots were at the controls, (b) Airbus A-320 planes 
were latest off the assembly line, and (c) ground personnel had undergone 
extensive training to be qualified. The intended message would have been 
directed at overcoming and/or negating any hesitation felt by prospective 
passengers.  
Given the nature of the UAE air industry and open skies policy, Air 
Arabia would be wise to operate within the criteria of a low-cost carrier as 
defined earlier in this paper. This would provide the differentiation they need 
in the very competitive marketplace. Maintaining this niche focus becomes 
more important as Emirates Airline is successfully transitioning the low-cost 
model of the short-haul carriers, that is, Southwest and easyJet into the full-
service offering, long-haul industry. Under such operational guidelines, there 
is the expectation that ticket prices will be set to compete on the low-cost 
template (EasyOz, 2005, p. 70).  
At the time of startup there was much skepticism whether this low-fare, 
no-frills airline would be able to attract customers. Public sentiment was that 
the typical passenger would be the student, and the low income laborer who 
returned to his/her home every few years. Since this research was conducted, 
Air Arabia has become a successful operator in the regional air industry. The 
marketing efforts were revamped and intensified to focus on broadening 
appeal to the traveling public. Additionally, service was scrutinized so as not 
to lose customers back to the full-service carriers. Air Arabia continues to 
operate in the low-fare, low-cost niche. Every year they expand their route 
network. 
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ABSTRACT 
In high-risk environments such as air traffic control, leadership on different levels 
plays a certain role in establishing, promoting, and maintaining a good safety 
culture. The current study aimed to investigate how leadership styles, leadership 
style adaptability, and over and under task leadership behavior differed across 
situations, operative conditions, leadership structures, and working tasks in an air 
traffic control setting. Study locations were two air traffic control centers in Sweden 
with different operational conditions and leadership structures, and an 
administrative air traffic management unit. Leadership was measured with a 
questionnaire based on Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD; 
Blanchard, Zigarmi & Zigarmi, 2003; Hersey & Blanchard, 1988). The results 
showed that the situation had strong impact on the leadership in which the 
leadership behavior was more relationship oriented in Success and Group situations 
than in Hardship and Individual situations. The leadership adaptability was further 
superior in Success and Individual situations compared with Hardship and Group 
situations. Operational conditions, leadership structures and working tasks were, on 
the other hand, not associated with leadership behavior.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Leadership on different levels is believed to be a key factor in almost 
any organizational success (Moy, 2004; Silverthorne, 2001; Weil, Bogue & 
Morton, 2001). Bennis and Nanus (1985) suggested that one of the most 
important predictors of organizational achievement is effective leadership 
and that ineffective leadership often is a predictor of an organizational 
failure.  In a high-risk environment, leadership on different levels seems to 
play a certain role in establishing, promoting, and maintaining a good safety 
culture, which is repeatedly stressed in the literature (Flin, 2003; 
Guldenmund, 2000). According to Bently and Haslam (2001), the 
management impact on safety arises both from their attitudes and their 
actions. The UK Health and Safety Regulator (HSE, 1999) points at 
management commitment, management style, and visible management as 
organizational factors that are associated with a safety culture. Several 
studies have also shown that safety is related to first-line supervisors’ 
leadership style and team management skills (Flin, 2003). Further, the 
managers’ commitment to safety and their attitudes concerning safety-related 
matters is of critical importance for a successful safety management system 
(Bailey, 1997; Clarke, 1999; Kirwan, 1998; O’Toole, 2002) and supervisors, 
site managers, and senior managers, all have significant positions in a safety 
management system (Flin, 2003).  
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There is additional support in the literature which demonstrates that 
leadership can influence work-related stress in the psychosocial work 
environment. A supportive leadership style maintained by the leaders can act 
as a buffer for reducing work-related stress among employees in a 
demanding work environment (Bakker, Killmer, Siegriest & Schaufeli,  
2000). According to Rowney and Cahoon (1988), leadership practices make 
a difference in the prevention or occurrence of stress and can help employees 
cope with stress factors. Leaders who allow employees a greater 
participation in decision-making and encourage a two-way communication 
process tend to generate a favorable climate among staff, characterized by 
less interpersonal conflict and hostility, and fewer non cooperative 
relationships (Oaklander & Fleishman, 1964). Assigning tasks, specifying 
procedures, and clarifying expectations have also been shown to result in 
reduced role ambiguity and increased job satisfaction among high 
occupational level employees (Gray-Toft & Anderson, 1985). On the other 
hand, the leadership can increase stress if it is too much control-oriented and 
structuring. A leader who constantly gives subordinates demanding 
instructions generates detectable physiological symptoms of stress among 
the staff (McCormick & Powell, 1988). 
It is thus important for all organizations to understand the role of 
leadership and that they identify the styles of leadership most effective to 
their business. The role of leadership and of leadership style may be even 
more significant in high-technology companies because of their unique 
business environments (Silverthorne, 2001). In a high-risk environment, 
such as air traffic control, the role of leadership and leadership style should 
be no less important, since the operational work is conducted in a high-
technology environment with great risk involved.   
The Swedish Air Navigation Service Provider, which operates in a high-
risk environment, has succeeded in creating an overall positive safety culture 
(Ek, Arvidsson, Akselsson, & Johansson, 2002) and psychosocial work 
environment (Arvidsson, Johansson, Ek, Akselsson, & Josefsson, 2004). The 
general purpose of this study is to investigate and describe situational 
leadership characteristics and leadership styles in this distinctive 
environment.  
The theory is based on task and relationship leadership behavior and 
subordinate maturity (Blanchard & Johnson, 2000; Hersey & Blanchard, 
1996; Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2006). Task behavior is described as 
the extent to which leaders are likely to organize and define the roles of the 
members of their group, to explain what activities each has to do and when, 
where, and how tasks are to be accomplished. Relationship behavior is 
referring to the extent to which leaders are likely to maintain a personal 
relationship between themselves and members of their group by opening up 
channels of communications, providing socio-emotional support, and 
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facilitating behavior. Maturity refers to the followers’ experience, 
willingness and ability to take responsibility. The level of maturity 
determines the appropriate combination of task and relationship behavior for 
the leader (see Figure 1). The leadership style profile is thus a description of 
how task and relationship behavior are used separately and in combination. 
Figure 1. The Situational Leadership Model (Hersey & Blanchard, 1996; Hersey, 
Blanchard & Johnson, 2006) 
 
 
The theory attempts to provide leaders with some understanding of the 
relationship between an effective leadership style and the level of maturity of 
their co-workers. Because abilities and motives among co-workers vary the 
leader must have sensitivity and diagnostic ability to perceive and appreciate 
these differences. Yet, even with good diagnostic skills, leaders may still be 
not effective unless they can adapt their leadership style to meet the demands 
of their environment (Hersey & Blanchard, 1996; Hersey, Blanchard & 
Johnson, 2006). This implies that if the needs and motives among co-
workers are different they must be treated differently. The leadership style 
adaptability is the measure of the leader’s ability to use an appropriate 
leadership style in a given situation. Over and under task behavior indicates 
how a possible lack of leadership style adaptability is constituted and should 
be interpreted. Over task behavior occurs when the current leadership style is 
more task oriented than appropriate in a given situation, and under task 
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behavior occurs when the current leadership style is less task oriented than 
appropriate.  
STUDY LOCATIONS 
To study situational leadership abilities, a group of team managers 
(TMs) were assessed by their team members at two Air Traffic Control 
Centers (ATCC) in Sweden, referred to as the en route ATCC and the 
arrival-and-departure ATCC. A group of department managers were further 
assessed by their department members at the Air Navigation Services (ANS) 
organizational unit, which is part of the Swedish LFV Group of Airports and 
ANS (Luftfartsverket) central head office. At the en route ATCC, the air 
traffic control work mainly consists of surveillance of en route air traffic, 
passing by on high altitude.  At the arrival-and-departure ATCC the air 
traffic control work is more active since most of the work is connected to air 
traffic arriving and departing from different airports in the area. Each team is 
managed by a TM. The teams have only a tactical function to coordinate 
individuals with different working tasks and positions. Accordingly, they do 
not primarily serve as operative air traffic control units. The aim is to shorten 
information paths and make each employee enjoy greater participation and 
influence concerning the ATCC’s overall operations and long term 
development. The TM's primary task involves human resource management, 
employee training and employee development, work scheduling, etc.  
At the arrival-and-departure ATCC, each TM also holds the position as 
watch supervisor (WS). WS can be described as an operative management 
position. For each shift a WS has responsibility for the operative work and 
care for such things as air traffic distribution in different sectors and that the 
work is conducted in a safe manner within the existing regulatory 
framework.  
At the en route ATCC, the TM position does not imply the position as 
WS. Instead, the TMs are regular air traffic controllers or air traffic control 
assistants with no operative management tasks.   
The study further involves the ANS unit, dealing with general air traffic 
management issues such as air traffic flow and airspace management. The 
work is exclusively administrative; no operative air traffic control is 
conducted. The two ATCCs and the ANS unit differ mainly from each other 
with respect to working tasks and methods. The organizational structure can 
be described as consisting of different small departments managed by a 
department leader with ordinary supervising tasks. 
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HYPOTHESES  
Apart from the followers’ maturity, other factors in the environment can 
have an impact on the leadership style adaptability and the leadership style 
profile. The working situation itself can be characterized by Success or 
Hardship and leadership actions can occur in Group or Individual situations. 
Hypothesis Ia therefore states that the leadership style adaptability, 
over and under task behaviors and leadership style profiles are dependent 
on the working situation and thus differ in Group or Individual situations. 
Hypothesis Ib states that the leadership style adaptability, over and 
under task behaviors and leadership style profiles are dependent on the 
working situation and thus differ in situations characterized by Success or 
Hardship. 
It is further assumed that the different leadership conditions at the two 
ATCCs will affect leadership performance. 
Hypothesis II therefore states that the leadership style profiles differ 
according to operational leadership conditions. 
Further it is assumed that the different working tasks and organizational 
structure at the ANS unit compared with the two ATCCs will affect the 
leadership. 
Hypothesis III thus states that the leadership style profiles will differ 
due to working tasks and organizational structures. 
The TMs at the arrival-and-departure ATCC who also holds the WS 
position practice leadership actions more frequently than the TM at the en 
route ATCC. Thus this group has more leadership experience with respect 
to both task requirements and relationship requirements and might therefore 
be more sensitive to followers’ maturity also when they act as TM than TMs 
at the en route ATCC. The department managers at the ANS unit are, in 
addition, full time leaders with constant responsibility for the daily work 
and the department’s performance which provide them with regular 
leadership experience. 
Hypothesis IV therefore states that the leadership style adaptability is 
assessed as more effective by organizational member’s with more 
experienced leaders.  
Hypothesis V states further that more experienced TMs and department 
managers will practice less over and under task behaviors than the less 
experienced TMs, since these leadership aspects are related to the leadership 
style adaptability. 
 Arvidsson, Johansson, Ek & Akelsson 73 
 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
The questionnaire used in the study was distributed to all 635 employees 
at the three units; 309 completed questionnaires were returned. Of these, 108 
were filled out by employees at the en route ATCC, 102 by employees at the 
arrival-and-departure ATCC, and 99 by employees at the ANS unit. 
Altogether 39 respondents dropped out for reasons such as 
maternity/paternity leave, on leave for sickness, training, vacation, etc. This 
resulted in a final response rate of 53% for the en route ATCC, 49% for the 
arrival-and-departure ATCC, and 54% for the ANS unit. At the en route 
ATCC, 52 respondents (48%) were men and 56 women (52%); at the arrival-
and-departure ATCC 53 were men (52%) and 49 women (48%); and at the 
ANS unit, 76 were men (76%) and 23 women (24%). Age, length of service, 
and position of the staff at the three units are presented in Table 1. The 
number of teams at the en route ATCC was 16, at the arrival-and-departure 
ATCC was 8 and at the ANS unit was 13. 
Table 1. Age, Length of Service of the Staff at the Three Air Traffic Management Units: 
The en route Air Traffic Control Center, the Arrival-and-Departure Air Traffic Control 
Center, and the Air Navigation Services Unit 
Age 21-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years >50 years 
En route ATCC 
Arr./dep. ATCC 
ANS unit 
23 (20%) 
34 (33%) 
10 (10%) 
45 (42%) 
37 (36%) 
22 (22%) 
20 (19%) 
18 (18%) 
25 (26%) 
20 (19%) 
13 (13%) 
42 (42 %) 
Length of 
service 0-24 months 2-5 years 6-10 years >10 years 
En route ATCC 
Arr./dep. ATCC 
ANS unit. 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
10 (10%) 
24 (22%) 
25 (24 %) 
16 (17%) 
13 (12%) 
19 (19%) 
7 (7%) 
69 (64%) 
56 (55%) 
66 (66%) 
 
Instrument 
Situational leadership was measured with the questionnaire LEAD 
(Blanchard, Zigarmi & Zigarmi, 2003; Hersey & Blanchard, 1988) in a 
modified version (Holmkvist, 2000). The questionnaire consists of 32 items, 
reflecting different situations, which are described to the respondent. Each 
item is answered by one of four alternatives. The respondent is asked to 
choose the alternative that best describes the respondent's expected behavior 
of their leader in each situation (see Appendix). Each item concerns 
leadership in Group or Individual situations or in terms of Success or 
Hardship. The method is therefore managing four types of situations: Group 
or Individual situations and situations characterized by Success or Hardship. 
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Leadership measures and statistical analysis 
For each study location and for each type of situation, the leadership 
style profiles were calculated as mean scores of the occurrence of each of 
four possible leadership styles S1-S4. S1 indicated high task/low relationship 
behavior, S2 high task/high relationship behavior, S3 low task behavior/high 
relationship and S4 low task/low relationship behavior (Hersey, Blanchard & 
Johnson, 2006). T-test for dependent samples was used to test for 
statistically significant differences between Success situations versus 
Hardship situations and between Individual situations and Group situations 
for each leadership style (Hypothesis Ia and Hypothesis Ib, respectively). T-
test for independent samples was used to calculate statistically significant 
differences in the occurrence of each leadership style between the three study 
locations (Hypotheses II and III).  
Leadership data were also calculated as mean scores with respect to 
leadership style adaptability for each situation and study location. The 
leadership style adaptability scale ranges from -32 (no adaptability) to +32 
(full adaptability) for each situation. The weighting is based on the 
Situational Leadership Theory (Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2006) and the 
leader with the highest probability of success of the alternatives offered in 
the given situation is always weighted +2. The leadership behavior with the 
lowest probability of success is always weighted -2. The second best 
alternative is weighted +1 and the third is weighted -1. T-test for 
independent samples was used to test for statistically significant differences 
in leadership style adaptability between the three study locations for each 
situation (Hypotheses I and IV).  
For each study location and for each type of situation, the LEAD data 
were further calculated as mean scores concerning over and under task 
behaviors. The over and under task behavior scales range respectively, from 
0 (no over or under task behavior) to 24 (maximum over or under task 
behavior) for each situation and are based on the leadership style 
adaptability. When the leadership style adaptability in a given situation is 
weighted +2 the over and under task behavior is 0. When the leadership style 
adaptability is weighted +1 the over or under task behavior is weighted +1, 
when -1 then +2 and when -2 then +3. T-test for independent samples was 
used to test for statistically significant differences in over and under task 
behavior between the three units and for each situation (Hypotheses I and 
V). 
RESULTS 
Leadership style profiles – Hypotheses I, II and III 
For all situations and study locations, the two most seldom-used 
leadership styles were S1—high task/low relationship behavior, and S4—
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low relationship/low task behavior, according to Figure 2.  For Success and 
Group situations, the overall most frequently-used leadership style was S3—
high relationship/low task behavior, and the second most frequently-used 
was S2—high task/high relationship behavior. In Hardship and Individual 
situations the most frequent leadership style used was S2—high task/high 
relationship behavior, and the second most frequent used was S3—high 
relationship/low task behavior. 
Figure 2. Leadership Style Profiles in Success, Hardship, Individual and Group Situations 
for each Study Location.  
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When the three study locations were compared according to leadership 
styles in different situations, only leadership style S1—high task/low 
relationship behavior for Group situations, became statistically significant 
different in the comparison between the two ATCCs according to Table 2. 
This result indicates that the TMs at the arrival-and-departure ATCC more 
often used leadership style S1—high task/low relationship behavior in Group 
situations, compared with the TMs at the en route ATCC. In the comparison 
between the en route ATCC and the ANS unit, four differences became 
statistically significant. In Success situations, the leadership style S3—high 
relationship/low task behavior was more often used by the TMs at the en 
route ATCC than by the department managers at the ANS unit. On the other 
hand, the department managers at the ANS unit more often used leadership 
style S1—high task/low relationship behavior in Hardship situations, S2— 
high task/high relationship behavior in Individual situations and S1—high 
task/low relationship behavior in Group situations, compared with the TMs 
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at the en route ATCC. In the comparison between the arrival-and-departure 
ATCC and the ANS unit no differences were statistically significant. 
Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation for the Occurrence of each Leadership Style in 
Success and Hardship Situations and in Individual and Group Situations at the Tree 
Study Locations and T-values for Differences between the Three Study Locations 
Situation Style M SD t-value 
  
E.r.  A.d. ANS E.r. 
 
A.d.
 
ANS E.r. / 
A.d.  
E.r. / 
ANS 
A.d./ 
ANS 
df=208 df=205 df=199 
Success S1 1.30 1.62 1.54 1.40 1.77 1.62 -1.46 -1.14 0.34 
 S2 4.44 4.61 4.87 2.33 2.41 2.49 -0.50 -1.27 -0.76 
 S3 6.33 5.82 5.38 2.92 2.59 2.87 1.34 2.36* 1.14 
 S4 3.93 3.95 4.21 3.26 3.23 2.65 -0.06 -0.69 -0.63 
Hardship S1 2.31 2.55 3.03 2.34 2.19 2.78 -0.78 -2.03* -1.36 
 S2 6.08 6.54 5.96 2.81 2.38 2.49 -1.26 0.33 1.69 
 S3 4.28 4.01 3.93 2.25 2.20 2.28 0.87 1.11 0.25 
 S4 3.33 2.90 3.08 2.47 2.08 2.25 1.37 0.77 -0.59 
Individual S1 1.49 1.39 1.51 1.72 1.61 1.91 0.43 -0.06 -0.45 
 S2 5.64 6.31 6.57 2.54 2.81 2.76 -1.83 -2.52* -0.64 
 S3 4.85 4.52 4.32 2.30 2.14 2.28 1.08 1.66 0.63 
 S4 4.02 3.77 3.61 2.67 2.70 2.27 0.66 1.19 0.48 
Group S1 2.11 2.77 3.06 1.97 2.32 2.67 -2.24* -2.93** -0.81 
 S2 4.89 4.83 4.26 2.49 2.22 2.12 0.17 1.94 1.86 
 S3 5.76 5.31 4.99 2.90 2.57 2.92 1.18 1.90 0.84 
 S4 3.24 3.08 3.69 2.71 2.42 2.25 0.46 -1.28 -1.85 
 
For each leadership style S1-S4, there was a statistically significant 
difference in the mean occurrence of each leadership style between Success 
and Hardship situations according to Table 3. Also in the comparison 
between Individual situations and Group situations the mean occurrence of 
each leadership style was statistically significant. 
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Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation for the Occurrence of each Leadership Style in 
Success and Hardship Situations and in Individual and Group Situations and T-values for 
Differences between Success Situations versus Hardship Situations and between Individual 
Situations and Group Situations 
Style M  SD  t-value 
 Suc. Hard
. 
Ind. Grp.  Suc. Hard
. 
Ind. Grp.  Suc. / 
Hard. 
Ind. / 
Grp. 
df=308 df=308 
S1 1.48 2.62 1.46 2.63  1.60 2.46 1.75 2.35  -9.26*** -9.53*** 
S2 4.63 6.19 6.16 4.67  2.40 2.58 2.72 2.30  -9.81*** 9.05*** 
S3 5.86 4.08 4.57 5.37  2.82 2.24 2.24 2.81  10.55*** -4.71*** 
S4 4.03 3.11 3.81 3.33  3.06 2.28 2.55 2.48  5.02*** 3.27** 
 
Leadership style adaptability – Hypotheses I and IV 
The results indicated that the leadership style adaptability was superior 
in Success and Individual situations compared with Hardship and Group 
situations, as Figure 3 illustrates. The differences between Success and 
Hardship situations were statistically significant [t(308) = 10.14, p ≤ 0.001)], 
as well as the differences between Individual and Group situations [t(308) = 
7.18, p ≤ 0.001]. 
 
Figure 3. Leadership Style Adaptability for the Three Study Locations in Success vs. 
Hardship Situations and Individual vs. Group Situations. 
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According to Table 4, no statistically significant differences concerning 
leadership style adaptability were found in any of the four studied situations 
in the comparisons among the three study locations. 
 
Table 4. Mean and Standard Deviation for Leadership Style Adaptability for each Study 
Location and Situation and T-values for Differences in Leadership Style Adaptability 
between the Three Study Locations 
Situation M SD t-value 
 
E.r.  A.d.  ANS E.r. 
 
A.d.
 
ANS E.r. / 
A.d.  
E.r. / 
ANS 
A.d.  / 
ANS 
df=208 df=205 df=199 
Success 11.56 10.53 11.27 6.20 6.29 5.78 1.20 0.35 -0.87 
Hardship 7.09 7.40 6.46 6.91 7.63 6.03 -0.31 0.69 0.96 
Individual 10.71 10.69 10.14 6.68 7.61 6.45 0.03 0.63 0.55 
Group 7.94 7.25 7.60 6.06 6.36 5.73 0.82 0.42 -0.41 
Note. A.d. refers to Arrival-and-departure air traffic control center, E.r. refers to En route air 
traffic control center, ANS refers to air navigation services unit. 
 
Over and under task behavior – Hypotheses I and IV 
The results indicated that the frequency of over and under task behavior 
was dependent on the situation, according to Figure 4. Thus, the comparisons 
between Success and Hardship situations concerning over task behavior 
turned out to be statistically significantly different [t(308) = 6.55, p ≤ 0.001] 
as well as concerning under task behavior [t(308) = 2.10, p ≤ 0.05]. Further, 
comparison between Individual and Group situations concerning over task 
behavior was statistically significantly different [t(308)= 4.63, p ≤ 0.001]. 
No statistically significant differences appeared in the comparison between 
Individual and Group situations concerning under task behavior. 
The under task behavior was more dominant than the over task behavior 
according to Figure 4, and the difference between under and over task 
behavior was statistically significant for Success situations [t(308)= 7.90, p ≤ 
0.001], Hardship situations [t(308) = 4.96, p ≤ 0.001], Individual situations 
[t(308) = 7.82, p ≤ 0.001] and for Group situations [t(308)= 5.51, p ≤ 0.001].
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Figure 4. Over and Under Task Behavior for each Study Location in Success vs. Hardship 
Situations and in Individual vs. Group Situations.  
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Table 5. Mean and standard deviation for over and under task behavior in Success and 
Hardship situations, and in Individual and Group situations at each study location and T-
values for differences in over and under task behavior between the three study locations 
Task 
behavior 
Situation M SD t-value 
 
 E.r.  A.d.  ANS E. r.
 
A.d.
 
ANS E.r. / 
A.d.  
E.r. / 
ANS 
A.d. / 
ANS 
df=208 df=205 df=199 
Over Suc. 5.94 6.74 6.34 3.69 3.97 3.97 -1.50 -0.75 0.70 
 Hard. 7.44 8.20 8.64 3.82 4.21 4.78 -1.37 -2.01 -0.69 
Under Suc. 9.90 9.79 9.49 4.96 5.23 4.10 0.15 0.63 0.45 
 Hard. 10.81 10.06 10.27 5.68 5.09 4.86 1.00 0.72 -0.30 
Over Ind. 6.17 6.56 7.21 3.34 3.90 3.72 -0.78 -2.13 -1.22 
 Grp. 7.21 8.37 7.77 3.87 4.16 4.82 -2.09 -0.92 0.95 
Under Ind. 10.21 9.75 9.55 4.99 5.45 4.34 0.64 1.02 0.30 
 Grp. 10.49 10.10 10.22 4.89 4.61 4.78 0.60 0.40 -0.19 
Note. A.d. refers to Arrival-and-departure air traffic control center, E.r. refers to En route air 
traffic control center, ANS refers to Air Navigation Services unit. 
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When the three study locations were compared concerning over and 
under task behavior in different situations, no statistically significant 
differences appeared, according to Table 5. 
DISCUSSION 
According to Hypotheses Ia and Ib, it was assumed that the leadership 
style adaptability, leadership style profiles, and over and under task behavior 
should differ in Group or Individual situations, and in situations 
characterized by Success or Hardship. The results gave strong support for 
these hypotheses. The results indicated that the frequency of leadership 
styles in use were statistically significantly different among all situations, 
and the leadership style adaptability was assessed as superior in Success and 
Individual situations compared with Hardship and Group situations. The 
same pattern holds true for over and under task behavior, which both were 
statistically less frequent in Success situations, compared with Hardship 
situations. In Individual situations over task behavior was also less frequent 
than in Group situations. Further support for Hypothesis I was found in the 
overall results, which showed that the two most seldom-used leadership 
styles were S1—high task/low relationship behavior, and S4—low 
relationship/low task behavior. For Success and Group situations, the overall 
most frequently used leadership style was S3—high relationship/low task 
behavior, and the second most frequently-used was S2—high task/high 
relationship behavior. In Hardship and Individual situations, the most 
frequent leadership style used was S2—high task/high relationship behavior, 
and the second most frequently-used was S3—high relationship/low task 
behavior. This indicates that the leadership was more relationship-oriented 
and supportive in Success situations and Group situations and more task 
oriented in Individual situations and in Hardship situations. 
It was further assumed according to Hypothesis II, that the leadership 
style profiles should differ between the two ATCCs because of different 
leadership structures and operational conditions. This hypothesis was not 
supported, since only one significant difference was found between these 
two study locations. When the en route ATCC was compared with the ANS 
unit, according to Hypothesis III, four statistically significant differences 
appeared. At the ANS unit the leadership style S—high task/low relationship 
behavior, was assessed as more frequent in Hardship and Group situations, 
compared with the en route ATCC. The leadership style S2—high task/high 
relationship behavior, in Individual situations, was further assessed as more 
frequently used by the staff at the ANS unit. On the other hand, the en route 
ATCC assessed the leadership style S3—high relationship/low task 
behavior, as more used by the leaders than the ANS unit did. Even though 
some differences appeared, no obvious pattern emerged that clearly 
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distinguished these two units from each other. Since these analyses further 
included a large number of comparisons, there is a possibility that some 
statistically significant differences are due to chance. In the comparison 
between the arrival-and-departure ATCC, and the ANS unit, no differences 
were statistically significant. Thus, these results did not unequivocally 
support the assumption that the leadership behavior at the three units differed 
in a systematic way. Instead, the leadership style profiles were similar at the 
three units as Figure 2 shows. Therefore, we conclude that the air traffic 
control work and the air traffic management have a stronger effect on the 
leadership style than differences in the leadership conditions and work tasks, 
for the three organizations reviewed by this study.   
The leadership style S3—high relationship/low task behavior, which 
was most frequently used in Success and Group situations, is referred to as a 
participative leadership style by Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson (2006). 
Participative leadership is known from other studies to generate a favorable 
climate among the staff, characterized by less interpersonal conflicts and 
better cooperative relationships (Oklander & Fleishman, 1964), which is 
positive for the psychosocial work environment. A supportive leadership 
style can further act as a buffer for reducing work-related stress according to 
Bakker et al. (2000). Since no strong support was found for Hypothesis II or 
Hypothesis III, a supportive leadership style seems to be promoted by the 
leaders at all units in Group and in Success situations. It is probably easier 
for a leader to release control and task-oriented behavior in a favorable 
situation, and give more responsibility to a group of followers than to a 
single individual. The results give further support for this view since the 
leadership was assessed as more task-oriented in Individual situations and in 
Hardship situations. Even though a supportive and participative leadership 
can be favorable for the psychosocial work environment, a task-oriented 
leadership is sometimes suitable and assigning tasks, specifying procedures, 
and clarifying expectations can, according to Gray-Toft & Anderson (1985), 
result in reduced role ambiguity and increased job satisfaction. The key is to 
adjust the leadership to fit the current situation and the maturity level among 
the followers.  
The ability to do so seems to be dependent on the situation, according to 
the present results. As mentioned previously, the leadership style 
adaptability was statistically significantly more accurate in Success and 
Individual situations than in Hardship and Group situations. The leadership 
adaptation process seems, therefore, to be more complex when facing a 
group, and in situations where problems are present in the environment. 
According to Hypothesis IV, the leadership style adaptability was assumed 
to be more efficient among the department managers at the ANS unit and 
TMs at the arrival-and-departure ATCC compared with the TMs at the en 
route ATCC. This was because the department managers at the ANS unit 
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constantly practice leadership and the TMs at the arrival-and-departure 
ATCC have an air traffic control operative management function that the 
TMs at the en route ATCC do not have. The results did not indicate that this 
should be the case, however. No differences between the three units were 
statistically significant, which implies that the leadership style adaptability 
was not affected by the different leadership conditions or the amount of 
leadership conducted. This might be somewhat surprising, but the 
administrative character of air traffic control work could, as previously 
mentioned, have an impact on the leadership practice. Since most of the 
activities in air traffic control involve great risks, the work is performed 
within a strict regulatory framework with standardized routines. The 
leadership actions could therefore be affected by the extensively 
standardized work environment and administrative procedures since the 
leader have no impact on the regulatory framework. The space that will 
allow leadership adaptation is limited, at least in the operative work. In 
addition, the air traffic controllers are well-trained and confident in their 
profession. No one knows better than them how to control the air traffic 
within their current sector. The leader has not the same overview or 
situational awareness concerning the current traffic as the air traffic 
controller. In that sense, the air traffic controllers are extremely mature in 
relation to their work tasks and current air traffic situation, whereby 
leadership adaptation becomes almost irrelevant.  
As mentioned previously, the most seldom practiced leadership style 
was S1—high task/low relationship behavior, which implies that the amount 
of task-oriented leadership was limited. The assessment of over and under 
task behavior gave further support for this view since the occurrence of 
under task behavior was statistically significant more often in all situations 
measured. Since for safety reasons, air traffic control work is conducted 
within a strict framework of rules and regulations, a more task-oriented 
behavior could be expected.  Even if the evidence on exactly how leadership 
influences organizational safety is less clear, it is apparent that psychologists 
attempting to measure safety culture believe that managerial actions and 
their commitment to safety are core components in the safety culture (Flin, 
2003). Past research by Zohar (2002) implies that a leadership behavior that 
closely monitors workers’ safety-related behavior can significantly improve 
the organizational safety. Despite this, the positive safety culture assessed in 
the Swedish ANS does not seem to be affected by the lack of task oriented 
leadership style among the TMs. A close monitoring of the safety work does 
not, however, necessarily contradict a more relationship-oriented leadership 
style. As mentioned previously, the air traffic controllers are further well 
trained and thereby mature in relation to their work, whereby no task 
oriented leadership is needed.  
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It was further assumed, according to Hypothesis V, that the department 
managers at the ANS unit and the TMs at the arrival-and-departure ATCC 
should practice less over and under task behavior, compared with the TMs at 
the en route ATCC, since this behavior is related to the leadership 
adaptability. The results gave no support for this hypothesis, however. Since 
no differences were found in the leadership style adaptability this result 
might not be surprising. 
The results from this study describe the situational leadership as rather 
homogenous over the three study locations despite differences in the 
leadership conditions. It is therefore assumed that the characteristics of air 
traffic control had a greater impact on the leadership performance than local 
differences in the organization. Large differences existed, on the other hand, 
between different types of leadership situations, with more accurate 
leadership adaptability in Success and Individual situations and a more 
supportive and relationship-oriented leadership in Success and Group 
situations.  
Even if past research has shown that the safety culture and the 
psychosocial work environment in many aspects are dependent on the 
leadership performance, it is hard to know whether, and in what way, the 
leadership described in this study has contributed to the overall positive 
safety culture and psychosocial work environment that exists in the Swedish 
ANS (Ek et al., 2002; Arvidsson et al., 2003). Thus, more research is needed 
to study the linkage between specific leadership styles and safety-related 
organizational aspects and working environment in air traffic control.   
The extent to which the results can be applied to other industries or 
settings is also an issue that needs to be considered. There are many 
characteristics in this environment that does not apply to other business 
environments, for example, the regulatory framework, standardized work 
procedures, etc. Air traffic control shares, in addition, certain conditions with 
other highly regulated environments that are automated and include 
significant risk factors. Therefore, some of the knowledge gained in these 
studies may be valuable also outside the area of air traffic control. 
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APPENDIX 
Example of LEAD question 
 
Situation 
The project group that your leader is supervising has come to a dead end. 
The group has misunderstood parts of the project definition and puts the 
blame on poor briefing. Meetings are used for pseudo-activities.  
Alternative actions 
A.  Your leader gathers the group and ensures that everybody who has 
any views is allowed to speak his mind. Your leader responds to 
misapprehensions, supports realistic proposals and shares her or his 
experience.  
B.  At a meeting your leader makes a point of bringing out the group’s 
own resources for solving the problems. 
C.  Your leader collects the group as soon as possible and finds out 
what has gone wrong. He or she clarifies the project description 
until convinced that everyone has understood.  
D.  Your leader helps the group to understand why the group has got 
into trouble and supports their own way of grappling with the 
problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On rare occasions, revolutionary products will enter an existing market 
and offer a design so unique as to create a new product classification.  Much 
like the change in the computer industry brought about by the introduction of 
the personal computer or the change in the phone industry brought about by 
the advent of the cellular phone, many experts in the aviation industry feel 
that the very light jet (VLJ), known by some as the microjet (Seidenman, 
2004), will also have a ground-breaking effect on the air travel equation.  
These aircraft will have five to six passenger seats, weigh less than 10,000 
pounds, and be able to operate safely from airports with runways as short as 
3,000 feet.  Initial data indicates that these aircraft will offer jet utility and 
performance and will be able to operate at lower costs relative to traditional 
jets (Asker, 2005).  Industry insiders predict that VLJs will bring about 
dramatic changes for air travelers, aircraft operators, and providers of aircraft 
support services.  The president of the National Business Aircraft 
Association (NBAA) predicts a new era of business travel will begin with 
the introduction of the VLJ (Morrison, 2005).   
On July 27, 2006, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted 
provisional certification to Eclipse Aviation and its Eclipse 500 (FAA, 
2006), the first of fourteen manufacturers seeking certification of twin- and 
single-jet designs, ranging from the traditional Cessna Aircraft Company to 
the nontraditional Honda Motor Company (Haines, 2005; Lunsford, 2004; 
VLJ Magazine, 2007).  In support of the aircraft, the NBAA, based on its 
knowledge of the users and manufacturers of these aircraft, has developed 
and released pilot training guidelines that many predict will become a 
baseline for VLJ insurance coverage, a service necessary for aircraft 
financing (NBAA, 2005; Trautvetter, 2005b).  In a related article, Asker 
(2005) reviewed recent VLJ sales data and noted that aviation industry 
analysts have predicted hundreds of cities could be transformed by low-cost 
air taxi service through the introduction of VLJs.  Ells (2005) noted that 
travelers are becoming more aware of the utility and economy of airport-to-
airport direct travel and affordable VLJs will provide a big boost to this 
market.  Support for these predictions can be found in a recent report of a 
Teal Group study.  This study concluded that business jet service is expected 
to grow because unlike air carriers operating from larger airports, business 
jets can serve smaller cities and offer less hijack threat and less security 
hassle (Solon, 2005).   
Studies conducted by organizations or by manufacturers are routinely 
referenced, and positive forecasts for future growth in the VLJ market are 
commonly cited in today’s literature (Seidenman, 2004; Trautvetter, 2005a).  
The depth and completeness of these studies are not publicly available, 
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however, and no common VLJ market information exists for all 
stakeholders.  For example, the question of sales demand for VLJ aircraft is 
a basic inquiry for manufacturers entering this market.  When looking at 
published research, Trautvetter (2005a) found wide-ranging estimates of 
VLJ demand with Rolls-Royce predicting 8,000 deliveries by 2023, Inflight 
Management Development Centre forecasting sales of 847 aircraft by 2013, 
and the FAA forecasting demand for 4,500 aircraft by 2016.  Market data 
from manufacturers is equally confusing with a sales forecast of from 5,000 
to 10,000 VLJs by 2014 (Seidenman, 2004). 
INSURANCE, TRAINING, AND REGULATORY ISSUES 
Predicting the availability of services in support of VLJ operation is 
important. Olcott (2004) reviewed the emerging VLJ market and discussed 
how best to train pilots, gain acceptance by the professional flying 
community and the FAA, and overcome the problem of insurability of 
owner-pilots.  In reviewing some of these same concerns, Trautvetter 
(2005a) suggested that because of FAA scrutiny and NBAA training 
guidelines, insurance costs for VLJ aircraft could be less than turboprop 
single-engine aircraft.  The NBAA Training Guidelines for Single Pilot 
Operation of Very Light Jets and Technically Advanced Aircraft was 
completed in January 2005 and included guidelines for initial candidate 
evaluation, pre-training study, manufacturer’s training, post rating training, 
initial operating experience, and annual recurrent training.  The guidelines 
cover four levels of training and suggest level of training should be based on 
experience.  For example, a pilot transitioning from the left seat of a jet 
aircraft is classified in category 1 and would receive 25 hours of operating 
experience while a less experienced single-engine pilot would be classified 
in category 4 and would receive 100 hours of operating experience.  
Intermediate level single- and twin-engine turboprop cabin-class experience 
would require 35 hours for category 2 training and 50 hours for category 3 
training.  Cessna Aircraft Company and Adam Aircraft Company have 
predicted anywhere from 14,000 to 20,000 twin-engine and turboprop 
aircraft owners as potential customers to move up to a VLJ (Trautvetter, 
2005b).  Similar guidelines for dual or mentor instruction are evident for the 
leading manufacturers (Eclipse, 2007; Sierra, 2007). 
In a presentation at the Latin American Business Aviation Event, Stine 
(2005) noted many common misconceptions about the availability of 
insurance for owner-flown VLJs.  In his summary, he stated that VLJ 
certification will follow predictable past models, most insurance 
underwriters are studying coverage guidelines, and some companies have 
already announced VLJ coverage based on proficiency and specific training 
requirements.  In a more recent review of the state of the aircraft insurance 
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industry, Chappell (2006) concluded that VLJs would be insurable and 
premiums would be based on aircraft quality; pilot skill and experience; and 
transition training programs.  He also concluded that the jet single-pilot 
operation would be insured at higher liability limits accompanied by higher 
premiums.   
Government support for these aircraft is also critical to success.  In his 
review of government support initiatives, Stine (2005) found several positive 
examples.  He noted that the FAA had provided additional resources for VLJ 
aircraft certification and revisions were being considered to key Federal 
Aviation Regulations to allow Part 23 certification for single-pilot Part 135 
operations.  He also found the FAA was supporting the development of FAA 
Industry Training Standard for Technically Advanced Aircraft.  He 
concluded that once certified and in service, VLJs are more likely to use 
smaller general aviation airports and thus would not add to congestion at 
larger airports.  This logic should be supported by most air-taxi operators 
seeking efficiency, profitability, and point-to-point customer travel needs.  
Reviewing the good and bad aspects of VLJ operations, Webster (2006) 
offered his expert commentary to the International Risk Management 
Institute.  In his review he considered the range of pilot skills, aircraft use, 
and owner-pilot background.  He concluded faster aircraft could be safer 
aircraft if pilots are properly trained and the new aircraft type is given 
respect. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study was undertaken to provide the data needed to answer some of 
these questions about the VLJ market.  The data was gathered by means of a 
self-administered questionnaire delivered electronically via the Internet.  The 
mailing list for the study was an opt-in list of magazine subscribers to 
Business & Commercial Aviation.  The questionnaire consisted of a section 
designed to measure the use of air service by respondents’ organizations, a 
section designed to assess perceptions and expected use of VLJ aircraft, and 
a demographic section to measure business characteristics. 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
While the response rate for the study is disappointing (160 respondents 
or 3.18%), the sample achieved does appear to be representative of the target 
population.  The validity of the sample may be indicated by two factors.  
First, those organizations that operate their own passenger aircraft stressed 
the importance of the availability of resources for such travel to a statically 
greater extent than organizations that do not operate their own aircraft.  
Second, and even more revealing regarding the nature of the sample, those 
that operate their own aircraft were statistically more likely to use VLJs for 
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trips under 500 miles than organizations that do not operate their own 
aircraft.  In other words, the sample appears to consist primarily of 
organizations that comprise the target market for VLJs. 
Furthermore, in summarizing significant positive responses (Table 1), 
we observed that the majority of the organizations represented in the sample, 
59.4%, use air services often (multiple flights per week) or extensively 
(multiple flights per day) and the vast majority of firms operate their own 
passenger aircraft (72.5%).  Additionally, 78.8% of the respondents occupy 
middle managers or higher positions in their firms.  Even more importantly, 
73.8% identify themselves as either a strong influencer or the main decision 
maker for the buying center of the organization.  Not surprisingly, most 
company trips are comprised of management personnel, 40.6%, or a mixture 
of different personnel, 53.8% (Table 2).  Finally, the majority of respondents 
appear to work for large businesses in that 60.1% reported annual 
organizational revenues of more than $6,000,000 and employment of an 
average of 4,536 organizational employees (Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 1.  Use of Air Service 
  Yes Percent 
  (N=160)  
1. Does your organization use air services multiple times/day? 39 24.4% 
2. Does your organization use air services multiple times/week?  56 35.0% 
3. Does your organization operate its own passenger aircraft? 116 72.5% 
4. Percent of flights using commercial air carriers? 147 91.9% 
5. Do you prefer jet aircraft over turboprop aircraft? 118 73.8% 
6. Percent of your flights involving 6 or fewer personnel? 141 88.1% 
7. Percent of your flights involving 4 or fewer personnel? 127 79.4% 
8. Are you in a key managerial position in your firm? 126 78.8% 
9. Are you a strong influencer or buying center decision maker? 118 73.8% 
 
Table 2. Type of Personnel that Uses Passenger Air Services         
 Number Percent 
No one 3 1.9% 
Primarily upper management 53 33.1% 
Primarily middle management 9 5.6% 
Primarily line management 3 1.9% 
Sales Representatives 5 3.1% 
Other Personnel 1 0.6% 
A mixture of different personnel 86 53.8% 
Total 160 100.0 
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Table 3. Considerations before a Very Light Jet Purchase 
 Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
To be considered effective, how many hours per year 
should very light jet aircraft be used? 2 1,008 343 205 
To be considered effective, how many trips (flights) per 
year should the very light jet be used? 1 600 109 105 
Number of locations your organization operates 1 1,000 32 123 
Number of employees in your organization 1 80,000 4,536 12,771 
Number of college educated employees in your 
organization 0 30,000 570 3,122 
  
     
Of key interest are the results regarding the number of personnel using 
air services and the likelihood the use of air services will increase with the 
introduction of VLJs.  Understanding that VLJs can accommodate up to six 
passengers, respondents were asked how many organizational personnel 
typically board the same flight.  Of the sample, 88.1% reported that normally 
six or fewer of their personnel fly on the same flight (Table 1).  With a 
normal seating capacity of six to seven (Seidenman, 2004) and with 
manufacturers targeting air-taxi operators and owner-pilots, VLJs appear to 
be well suited to address these organizations’ air service needs.   
Table 4. Annual Gross Sales/Revenues for Respondent Organizations 
  Frequency Percent Responding 
Less than $500,000 19 8.1 
$500,000-$1,000,000 12 6.3 
$1,000,001-$6,000,000 23 12.5 
$6,000,001-$10,000,000 10 8.8 
Over $10,000,000 69 51.3 
Missing (did not answer) 27 13.1 
Total 160 100.0 
 
  
The respondents indicated a strong preference for flying on jets as 
opposed to turboprop aircraft, 73.8% (Table 1).  They also indicated they 
would expect to fly these aircraft an average of 343 flight hours/year and 
operate an average of 109 flights per year (Table 3).  The respondents also 
were asked how likely their use of air services would increase once VLJs are 
introduced.  Of the sample, 53.8% indicated either “perhaps would increase” 
or “absolutely would increase,” and 8.7% of the sample was unsure (Table 
5).  Thus, the potential market for VLJs seems quite strong, as a large 
percentage of air service clients may be likely to switch to them once they 
are introduced.  Looking at the classifications of the respondents’ 
organizations (Table 6), we observe that services represent the largest 
respondent group, 37.5%, followed by manufacturing, 24.4%, with 
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transportation being the largest single respondent group, 20%.  Most 
organizations had less than 10 different personnel using air services, or 
45.7%; however, 23.1% said that over 100 different personnel used air 
services annually (Table 7).  
Table 5. Increase in Use of Passenger Air Services Due to Availability of Very Light Jet  
   Frequency Percent 
Yes, absolutely 31 19.4 
Perhaps 55 34.4 
No 60 37.5 
Don’t know/unsure 14 8.7 
Total 160 100.0 
Table 6.  Industrial Classification of Respondent Organizations 
  Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing (industrial) 19 11.9 
Manufacturing (technological) 12 7.5 
Manufacturing (consumer) 8 5.0 
Finance/Real Estate/Insurance 27 16.9 
Merchandising/Retail-services 4 2.5 
Other services 29 18.1 
Government 7 4.4 
Utilities 2 1.3 
Transportation 32 20.0 
Construction/Engineering 8 5.0 
Communication 7 4.4 
Other 2 1.3 
Missing (did not answer) 3 1.9 
Total 160 100.0 
 
Table 7. Annual Number of Personnel Using Air Service 
                                     
 Frequency Percent Responding 
None 2 1.3 
1-5 55 34.4 
6-10 16 10.0 
11-25 18 11.2 
26-50 18 11.2 
51-75 7 4.4 
76-100 6 3.8 
Over 100 37 23.1 
Missing 1 0.6 
Total 160 100 
 
The respondents were asked to rate VLJ use on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 
being least important and 5 being most important.  Of interest we found that 
VLJ use was considered important for short trips up to 500 miles and longer 
trips over 500 miles.  Operation with a single pilot was not considered to be 
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a handicap by prospective VLJ users.  Most believe that VLJ use would open 
up new markets but were very concerned about the availability of ground 
transportation, fuel, and food services at smaller airports (Table 8). 
Table 8. Importance of Very Light Jets and Other Services at Airports 
    Mean Std. Dev. 
How important are VLJs on trips up to 500 miles 3.03 1.048 
How important are VLJs on trips over 500 miles? 3.53 1.062 
VLJs will open access to new markets. 2.88 1.356 
How important is VLJ operation with single-pilot option? 2.16 1.284 
How important are ground travel assets at smaller airports? 4.15 0.793 
How important is jet fuel availability at smaller airports? 4.31 0.730 
How important is food service at smaller airports? 3.09 0.983 
Scale: 1 = least important and 5 = most important 
VLJ = Very Light Jets 
 
In order to further assess the impact that VLJs may have on the market, 
an examination of factors that were likely to impact the likelihood of 
increasing air service use due to VLJs was conducted.  Regression analysis 
(see Table 9) revealed that two factors significantly influence increased use.  
Specifically, the fact that VLJs allow access to previously inaccessible 
markets, as well as the importance of the availability of food service at small 
airports, increased the likelihood of increased air service usage.  This finding 
is encouraging in that regarding the marketability of these aircraft, potential 
customers of VLJs already recognize the prime benefit that VLJs offer their 
businesses: reaching more of their own customers more easily. 
 
Table 9. Likelihood That Very Light Jets Will Increase Air Service Use 
Variables Beta t ρ 
VLJs Allow Access to Previously Inaccessible Markets .576 6.292 .000 
Importance of Food Service for Aircraft at Small Airports .191 2.082 .041 
Adjusted R2=.346; F(76 d.f.) = 21.669, p = .000 
VLJ = Very Light Jet 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
VLJs will soon be available in quantity and will offer budget-minded 
business travelers a new substitute for traditional airline and executive jet 
service.  Today, fifteen manufacturers are posed to capture part of this new 
market.  Stone (2003) refers to them as a “new generation of aviation 
entrepreneurs” (p. 60).  VLJ supporters seem to view the use of these aircraft 
as an economical way to save time by avoiding the congestion associated 
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with large airports; they believe this convenience will open up new customer 
markets.  According to Stine (2005), the argument of some that thousands of 
VLJs will create their own type of airspace congestion will probably not 
occur.  By design, VLJs can operate from most of the 5000 public use 
airports in the U.S. while the airlines currently use only 429 (Industry Facts, 
2004).  Also, of those used by the airlines, only 30 airports are centers for 
terminal area class B airspace control, and only a minority of this group 
experiences most of the recorded flight delays annually (Avoiddelays.com, 
2007).  VLJs by design and due to projected point-to-point use will avoid 
most of these airports and the approach and departure corridor congestion 
and delay associated with these airports. 
The respondents of this survey seem to represent a good sample of the 
market for VLJ ownership and air-taxi use.  The majority said they are likely 
to use VLJs when available.  A majority seemed to prefer jets and already 
operate their own aircraft.  The fact that almost 90% of the respondents’ 
business trips involve six or fewer people makes the VLJ a strong candidate 
for these organizations.  Not all of the initial manufacturers will survive the 
market shakeout, and concerns over support services at smaller airports will 
have to be addressed if the jets are to reach their full potential.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study focused on describing the prospective operators of VLJ 
aircraft.  Future market research should focus on those stakeholders 
impacted by the use of this new aircraft type.  Specifically, future research 
should examine the impact of VLJs on airports, maintenance operations, and 
food service operations, to name a few.  In other words, stakeholders need an 
understanding of how air support services should adapt to meet the needs of 
VLJ users.  Such an examination will provide VLJ manufacturers with a 
clearer understanding of the true market and impact of these aircraft.   
Additional research should focus upon those factors that will drive 
demand for VLJs.  For instance, a better understanding of the needs of air 
service customers is required, in addition to the psychographic factors (such 
as trust in the product and/or manufacturer) that may influence customers’ 
demand for these aircraft.  With this understanding, VLJ manufacturers will 
be better positioned to properly market this new product, and air support 
providers will gain an increased ability to fulfill adequately the new 
requirements generated by the introduction of these new jets.   
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Sample Book Review
Books chosen for review by the Journal of Air 
Transportation will focus on areas of interest to its 
readership. These subjects include topics related to 
aviation and/or space transportation, both technical and 
non-technical. An article should be written in a concise 
and sufficiently non-technical language to be intelligible to 
both aeronautics generalists and to specialists in other 
fields.
Individuals wishing to nominate a book for review or who 
are interested in reviewing books for JAT should notify the 
editor at the below address. Also, authors or publishers 
wishing to have a book considered for assessment should 
send a review copy to this address:
Aviation Institute / JAT
University of Nebraska at Omaha
6001 Dodge Street
Omaha, NE 68182-0508 U.S.A.
E-mail other correspondence concerning reviews to 
journal@unomaha.edu
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Review Procedures
Book reviews should present both a summary and critical evaluation of significant 
investigations and provide suggestions for further inquiry. A good review will include both 
a subjective and an objective account of the work. Provide proof to substantiate your 
position.
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Criteria
In reviewing the book, include a combination of the following elements:
personal impression
analysis of objective
presentation interpretative capability
a generalization of main statements
subject orientation
overall valuation
Articles accepted for publication will not undergo the standard JAT blind review 
process, but will be reviewed by the editorial staff for relevance and compliance with 
the following criteria:
Does the book present a topic of interest to readers of JAT?
Does the review portray a clear idea of the contents of the book?
Does the review depict a fair and accurate presentation of the book?
Does the review maintain a balance between content and critique?
Does the submission fit within the specified format and length requirement?
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Format
All review articles must be submitted in electronic format on an IBM formatted 3.5 
diskette and must be in a standard word-processing format such as WordPerfect or 
Microsoft Word. 
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Author Description
Reviews should include a brief description of the author’s institutional affiliation, 
highest degree earned, and areas of research/teaching interest. 
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Bibliographic Citation
Every review article should begin by citing the book(s) to be reviewed with full bibliographic 
information including author(s), copyright date, full title, place of publication, publisher, number 
of pages, ISBN number, and price if available in U.S. dollars.
The following are examples of bibliographic citation:
Kern, T. (1997). Redefining airmanship. New York: Mc-Graw-Hill. Pp. xi + 463. ISBN 0- 07-
034284-9. U.S. $29.95 hard cover.
Findlay, C., Sien, C.L., & Singh, K (Eds.). (1997). Asia Pacific air transport: Challenges
and policy reforms. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. xix + 208. ISBN
981-230-002-3. U.S. $39.90 soft cover.
Horonjeff, R., & McKelvey, F.X. (1994). Planning and design of airports (4th Ed.). New
York: McGraw-Hill. Pp. x + 829. ISBN 0-07-045345-4. U.S. $54.95 hard cover.
Length
Review articles should be between 750-1500 words. Reviews outside these limits may be
considered at the Editor’s discretion. Comparative reviews of two books may be somewhat 
longer, but should not exceed 3000 words. Comparative reviews of more than two books are 
discouraged.
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Editorial Policy
Reviews appearing in the JAT represent the opinions of the reviewer and are not necessarily 
those of the editorial staff. Reviewers should have some authority or experience in the subject 
area. Reviews may contain positive or negative evaluations of the book. Negative remarks 
should be objective, precise, and expressed in a constructive, respectful manner. Vague or 
unsubstantiated criticism may be offensive to an author and generally fails to persuade a 
reader. Inflammatory remarks will not be accepted.
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Solicited Reviews
The maximum time allowed for completing a solicited review will be four weeks. If a reviewer 
is unable to meet this deadline, please inform the editor of a new date for completion or return 
the book so another reviewer can be contacted. For reviewers living outside the U.S.A., reviews 
may be returned via e-mail. 
Conflict of Interest
Reviews written by the book’s author(s), publisher, distributor, or by colleagues at the same 
institution or organization will not be considered. Also, duplicate reviews (previously 
published) will not be accepted. All authors of book reviews are required to include with their 
submission the following statement signed and dated. I, author’s name, do not have any 
commercial interest in the main topic of the book under review, nor am I associated with a 
company or other organization with commercial interest in the main topic of the book.
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Sample Book Review
Sample Book Review
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In order to view the sample book review you will need Adobe Acrobat Reader. If you do 
not have a copy you may download if for free by clicking here.
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Authors wishing to submit original 
manuscripts for consideration should send 
two double-space paper copies and one 
electronic copy either via email at 
journal@unomaha.edu or on an IBM 
compatible three and one-half inch diskette 
to the following address:
Aviation Institute/JAT
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Allwine Hall 422
6001 Dodge Street
Omaha, NE 68182-0508
U.S.A.
JAT GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS
Format
Figures and Tables
Reference Style
Review Process
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Format
All papers must be written in the English language. Use a 12 point font and allow for a 1"
margin on all sides. Double-space all material including quotations, the abstract, notes, and
references. All figures and tables should be on a separate page at the end of the text. Include the
figure name and filename on the bottom of the page. Please proofread all article submissions for
punctuation, spelling, and format errors.
The cover page should include the title of the manuscript, the author's name(s), shipping and email
addresses, telephone number, and a short biographical statement summarizing the author's
education and current affiliation. Please note the primary contact person. The second page should
contain an abstract of the manuscript. The abstract should include a concise description of the
contents of the paper, the research method used, and the results. Abstracts should generally be
kept to about 100 words.
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Figures and Tables
Figures and tables should appear at the end of the paper with each item on a separate page. Indicate 
in the text the approximate location where each figure and table should be placed. Figures, tables, 
and the text should each be saved as separate files. Do not embed tables and figures in the text files. 
Include the appropriate file name at the bottom of the page for each figure and table. Figures and 
tables must be camera-ready, printed in black ink only and must fit with in a 4 inch by 7 inch area.
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Reference Style
Due to the international participation, rigid referencing style criteria are not mandated. 
Acceptable reference styles of the author's country will apply. For the U.S.A., the most
recent edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) Manual of Style is preferred.
Ensure all references are cited and all citations are referenced.
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Review Process
A rigorous double-blind review will be conducted by the JAT  Panel of Reviewers. 
Additionally, a member of the Editorial board will conduct a third review. If revisions
are necessary, the editor will determine when a revised manuscript is in compliance with reviewer
recommendations. Authors must make revisions to original documents and resubmit them to
JAT on disk in Word or Word Perfect format. All revisions must be completed within two
weeks after return to the author. Manuscripts must be original, not previously published, nor under
consideration for another journal while undergoing review by the JAT.
Copyrights: Copyrights are retained by the authors and the JAT. Permission to duplicate and
distribute for educational purposes at no charge is granted.
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Additional Information
Additional information is available on the JAT web site at
http://jat.unomaha.edu or by contacting the JAT directly at 402-554-3424 or
journal@unomaha.edu
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